University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Articles

Faculty Publications

1992

The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone
Management in Washington State
Ralph W. Johnson
University of Washington School of Law

Craighton Goeppele
David Jansen
Rachael Paschal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ralph W. Johnson, Craighton Goeppele, David Jansen, and Rachael Paschal, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in
Washington State, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 521 (1992), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/469

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.

Copyright D 1992 by Washington Law Review Association

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT IN
WASHINGTON STATE
Ralph W. Johnson*

Craighton Goeppele**
David Jansen***
Rachael Paschal****
Abstract:The public trust doctrine is an ancient doctrine that has recently emerged as a
powerful tool to protect the public interest in tidelands and shorelands. Created and
developed by the judiciary, the doctrine's principles have found their way into several of
Washington's regulatory statutes, such as the Shoreline Management Act and the Aquatic
Lands Act. This Article traces the development of the doctrine in Washington, and
explains the relation between the state's police power and the public trust doctrine. This
Article also sets forth the current contours of the public trust doctrine in Washington, and
charts potential future developments of this dynamic common law doctrine.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Introduction to the Public Trust Doctrine

The use and management of Washington State's coastal resources is
a subject of intense interest to many different groups: state and local
government agencies responsible for shoreline management; courts
adjudicating policy and administrative issues; and of course, the public
that owns and utilizes the tidelands, shorelands, and waters of Washington's rivers, lakes, and coast-line. Federal, state, and local governments have adopted statutes and regulations in an attempt to regulate
and protect the coastal environment. One state statute in particular,
the Shoreline Management Act of 1971,' attempts a comprehensive
approach to managing the coastal area, and implicates local, state, and
federal actions in its implementation.
In recent years, an ancient legal concept has been rediscovered as a
tool for coastal resource management. The public trust doctrine is
rooted in Roman tradition, but courts throughout the United States
have recently shown great interest in the doctrine as. a flexible method
for judicial protection of public interests in coastal lands and waters.
Simply stated, the public trust doctrine provides protection of public
ownership interests in certain uses of navigable waters and underlying
lands, including navigation, commerce, fisheries, recreation, and environmental quality. While tidelands may be sold into private ownership through conveyance of thejus privatum, the public trust doctrine
reserves a public property interest, thejuspublicum, in these lands and
the waters flowing over them. Indeed, the public trust interest in these
lands and waters is so strong that government can defeat the public
right only by express legislation, and then only to p:omote other public, rather than private, values. The doctrine also applies to stateowned lands, and imposes duties on state government and state agencies with respect to uses that can be made of these lands.
The public trust doctrine differs from regulatory schemes for coastal
management in several respects. First, the doctrine is created, developed, and enforced by the judiciary. While the doctrine is fully binding law on state government, it stems from the courts rather than the
1. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58 (West Supp. 1991).

524

Public Trust Doctrine
legislature. The doctrine also contains several features not generally
found in statutes. Its scope is flexible, and courts may expand or limit
it on a case-by-case basis. When properly invoked, the doctrine can
limit private property rights while avoiding claims of unconstitutional
takings. Unlike statutes, the doctrine has a quasi-constitutional
nature. The legislature may extinguish the doctrine, but only in limited, explicitly-stated circumstances, and only for other public
purposes.
The public trust doctrine arises out of the universally recognized
need to protect public access to and use of such unique resources as
navigable waters, beds, and adjacent lands.2 This public need is met
through recognition of a property right, akin to an easement, that is
owned by the state and subject to state control for the benefit of the
public interest in navigation, commerce, environmental quality, and
recreation. If the state wishes to control the use of this easement,
including use by either the private owner or by the public, the state is
merely controlling a right that it already owns. 3 It is not regulating
private property. The exercise of these state management or ownership rights do not therefore raise "takings" questions under the federal
or state constitution because no regulation of private property is
involved.
2. The law has long recognized public rights in waterways under several theories in addition
to the public trust doctrine. For example, the federal and state navigation servitudes also further
the public interest in navigation, often to the detriment of private property interests. See infra
notes 172-76 and accompanying text. The Washington Supreme Court has also protected public
rights on non-navigable waters. In Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968), the
court held that riparians have the right to prohibit non-riparian (i.e. non-water dependent) fills or
constructions on lakes. State and local governments may also regulate development on such
waters through their police power. Id. at 580, 445 P.2d at 652. In In re Martha Lake Water Co.,
152 Wash. 53, 57, 277 P. 382, 383 (1929), the court held that appropriations from lakes that
lower lake levels can unreasonably interfere with riparian tights.
3. A distinction should be made here. This Article considers three kinds of ownership: 1)
where the state has title to the beds of navigable waters or other land subject to the public trust
easement; 2) where title to the land has been conveyed into private ownership, but the land is still
subject to the public trust easement; and 3) where the state does not own a public trust easement
on privately owned land. With regard to (1) and (2) the state does not regulate the use of these
property interests under the police power, rather it manages these interests as an owner on behalf
of the public.
Some early cases and statutes assumed the states owned the fish and waters and could
therefore regulate fishing and the allocation and use of waters. Current jurisprudence rejects the
ownership concept for wild fish and waters in lakes and streams, saying that these resources are
unowned. The current trend is to hold that the state power to regulate fisheries and water
allocation is based on retained sovereign state police power. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979). States need not own waterbeds, waters, or fish, in order to exercise regulatory
authority.
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This Article considers several aspects of the public trust doctrine.
First, the public trust is a state law doctrine, and its geographical
scope and the interests it protects vary from state to state. Second,
the doctrine is a product of judicial decisionmaking; it was initially
recognized in the courts of the United States and England as an incident of sovereignty and is explained and implemented in these courts.
The courts continue to determine its scope and usage.' A member of
the public has legal standing to bring suit to protect public trust
resources. 6 The suit can be brought against a private landowner who
threatens to interfere with or destroy public trust resources, or against
a state agency where it fails to protect public trust interests in the
management of state-owned land.
Third, the public trust is a true common law doctrine-it is flexible,
and courts enlarge and diminish it according to changing public needs
on the one hand, and legitimate private expectations on the other. The
doctrine defines both the public interest in private property and the
uses that can be made of such property consistent with the doctrine.
It also determines the policies that control management of publicly
owned lands.7 In sum, the public trust doctrine defines the intersection of private ownership and public trust rights, as well as the intersection of public ownership and public trust duties.
Many of the interests protected by the public trust doctrine can also
be protected by state exercise of its regulatory power. Why then do we
need the public trust doctrine? Or, to put it another way, what are the
significant differences between reliance on the doctrine and reliance on
the regulatory power of the state?
The public trust doctrine is a judicial doctrine with ancient common
law roots. History tells us that the interests protected by this doctrine
are so important that their protection cannot be entrusted entirely to
unfettered control by state legislatures.' In using the public trust doctrine, courts review legislation almost as if they were measuring that
4. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
5. See, e-g., Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing and Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988);
CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d
306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
6. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971); Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 308-09, 462
P.2d at 234.
7. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 638-42, 747 P.2d 1062, 1071-73 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
8. See, eg., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 -54 (1892). For discussion of this
case see infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
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legislation against constitutional protections. 9 In fact, the doctrine's
character lies somewhere between an ordinary rule of law and a constitutional requirement. It is more powerful than the ordinary rule of
law, but not as powerful as a constitutional clause that more readily
justifies striking down inconsistent legislation. It might be labelled a
quasi-constitutional doctrine.
Police power regulation is a product of the legislative process. This
process can be slow, unwieldy, and costly, and in the meantime permanent damage may be done to public trust interests. Once navigable
waters have been filled, or buildings constructed, they are seldom
removed. The loss of open space, wetlands, navigable capacity, and
fish and wildlife is often permanent. Also, if legislation is passed, it
may provide only partial protection for the interests involved, contain
loopholes, and become out-of-date. Enforcement may be spotty or
inadequate. The public trust doctrine is premised on the belief that
public trust interests are so profoundly important that they justify
judicial review of legislation adversely impacting them, involving both
the courts and the legislature in coastal management.
Another important feature of the doctrine is that it can significantly
reduce takings claims by owners of tidelands and shorelands. The
public trust doctrine initially applied to all state-owned beds of navigable rivers and tidelands when Washington State entered the Union in
1889. Subsequently, large portions of those lands were conveyed into
private ownership. But the public trust, like a covenant or easement,
continued to burden that property, even though the new owners
received no express notice of the public trust burden. As a result, private land owners cannot claim a right to do anything that is inconsistent with the trust. Therefore, successful reliance on the public trust
doctrine means that the takings issue is significantly diminished, if not
avoided altogether.
B

Scope of the Study

Part II begins with a history of the development of the public trust
doctrine. Roman jurists first elucidated the doctrine, and it entered
America's legal system by way of English common law. Next, part II
traces the chronological development of the public trust doctrine in
Washington. The state constitution contains several articles that
9. For example, the Washington Supreme Court wrote in Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d
662, 666, 732 P.2d 989, 992 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988): "The legislature has never
had the authority, however, to sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such
tidelands and shorelands." Thus, the doctrine, like a constitutional principle, constrains the
power of the legislature.
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embody public trust principles. 10 Washington's courts have also
developed the doctrine. In early cases the Washington Supreme Court
recognized certain public rights, such as the right of navigation, but
did not explicitly label these decisions as public trust cases."I Finally,
in two 1987 cases the court explicitly identified the doctrine as part of
Washington law.' 2
Part II continues with an examination of several state statutes that
express the values of the doctrine. The harbor area system,13 the Seashore Conservation Act, 4 the Shoreline Management Act,15 and the
Water Resources Act' 6 each regulate either public or private lands
and waters subject to the public trust. The Aquatic Lands Act 17 has
set forth proprietary goals and standards for management of state
lands. Part II identifies congruities found between the regulatory
goals of these statutes and the values expressed by the public trust
doctrine. The interrelationship of the public trust doctrine with the
regulatory power expressed in these statutes is a central issue in this
part and the Article as a whole. This part also analyzes the obligations
placed on state government for management of state-owned lands that
are subject to the public trust doctrine.
Part III examines the practical elements of the doctrine, including
its geographical scope and the variety of interests it protects. The doctrine is not extensively developed in Washington, but the state
supreme court has indicated it has not decided the entire scope of the
doctrine.1 This Article therefore examines decisions from other state
courts around the country that address coastal management issues,
and that may provide guidance to Washington courts and practitioners in predicting the future scope of the doctrine. Part III also sets
forth the ways in which the public trust can be defeated, both by state
and private action, and describes the various remedies available for
conduct inconsistent with the public trust.
Part IV discusses the relation between the public trust doctrine and
the takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Part V
10. WASH. CONST. art. XV; id. art. XVII, § 1.
11. See infra part II.B.2.
12. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621,
639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
13. WASH. CONST. art. XV; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 79.90.010-.070 (West 1991).

14. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.51.650-.765 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
15. Id. § 90.58 (West Supp. 1991).
16. Id. § 90.54.
17. Id. §§ 79.90-.96 (West 1991).
18. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
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addresses other legal issues, including standing and federal supremacy,
that can affect the application of the doctrine.
II.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

A.

Origins and Early History

The public trust doctrine originated from the widespread public
practice, since ancient times, of using navigable waters as public highways for navigation, commerce, and fisheries. The earliest articulation
of the doctrine is sometimes attributed to the Institutes of Justinian of
533 A.D., 9 which provided that by the law of nature, things that are
common to humankind are the air, running water, the sea, and the
seashores.
In England the doctrine was well established by the time of the
Magna Charta.2 0 Leading English court decisions2 1 recognized that
the Crown held the beds of navigable waters in trust for the people for
navigation,22 commerce, and fisheries.23 Even the Crown could not
24
destroy this trust.
In the United States cases as early as Arnold v. Mundy,2 5 decided in
1821, recognized and upheld the doctrine. In Mundy the New Jersey
court declared the trust as we know it today. The dispute concerned
an oyster bed that was part of a pre-statehood conveyance from the
King of England. Conveyances eventually led to Arnold's ownership
and use as a private oyster bed. This exclusive use was challenged by
Mundy, who insisted the public had a right to take oysters in this area
as it had done for many years. The court ruled in favor of Mundy,
giving the first clear formulation of the doctrine. It said that under the
19. J. INST. 2.1.1. The Institutes ofJustinian, a general textbook of Roman law, was issued
around 533 A.D. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 41 (1962); see
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources."
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633-34 (1986).
20, For a comprehensive analysis of Roman and common law development of the public trust
doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 475-76 (1970); Comment, The Public Trust in
Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-74 (1970).
21.

See 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS

ANGIAE [ON THE

LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 39-40 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard University Press
1968) (n.p., n.d.).
22. Attorney Gen. v. Parmeter, 147 Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex. 1811), aff'd sub nom. Parmeter v.
Gibbs, 147 Eng. Rep. 356 (H.L. 1813).
23. Carter v. Murcot, 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1768); Le Case del Royall Piscarie de le Banne
[The Royal Fishery of the River Banne], 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1610); 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 180-82 (Robert E. Clark ed., 1970).
24. Sax, supra note 20, at 476.
25. 10 Am. Dec. 356 (N.J. 1821).
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natural law, civil law, and common law, the navigable rivers in which
the tide ebbs and flows, and the beds and waters of the seacoast are
held by the sovereign in trust for the people. 26
The court said that the states, being sovereign governments, had
succeeded to the English trust which was held by the Crown and that
a grant purporting to divest the citizens of these common rights was
void.2 7 The people, through their government, may regulate public
trust resources by building ports, basins, docks and wharves,
reclaiming land, building dams, locks and bridges, and improving fishing places, but the sovereign power itself "cannot . . . make a direct
waters of the state, divesting all the citizens
and absolute grant of the
' 28
of their common right.
Seventy years later, in Illinois CentralRailroadv. Illinois,2 9 the U.S.
Supreme Court built upon the principles articulated in Mundy and
used the public trust doctrine to invalidate one of the more outrageous
land giveaways of the 19th century. In 1869 the Illinois legislature
deeded the bed of Lake Michigan along the entire 'Chicago waterfront
to the Illinois Central Railroad. In 1873 the legislature, suffering
pangs of conscience, repealed the grant. Ten years later the state sued
in state court to establish the invalidity of the railroad's continued
assertion of ownership over the harbor bed.3 0 The Supreme Court
held the revocation valid, saying that a grant of all the lands under
navigable waters of a state was, "if not absolutely void on its face,
[then] subject to revocation": the state cannot "abdicate its trust over
.. [any more than
property in which the whole people are 3interested
1
it can] ... abdicate its police powers."
Mundy and Illinois Central establish the public trust doctrine as
part of the common law adopted by the various states. These cases
hold that legislatures will be held to a high standard, a trust-like standard, with regard to public trust resources. The above-quoted language of the two opinions suggests that the doctrine may even limit
legislative power.32 At the least, the doctrine establishes a potent rule
of construction, requiring that legislatures conveying away or changing the status of public trust resources must do sc explicitly.
26. Id. at 368.
27. Id. at 369.
28. Id. at 369-70.
29. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
30. The company removed the case to federal court, raising the issue whether the repeal
offended the Contracts Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the
Federal Constitution. Id. at 433.
31. Id. at 453-54.
32. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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In England the doctrine was applied primarily to the bed of the sea
and to tidelands.33 The United States, in contrast, has large navigable
rivers, such as the Mississippi and the Columbia, flowing inland for
hundreds of miles. Not surprisingly, the U.S. courts extended the doctrine to cover navigable fresh waters.34 Thus, in this country, the doctrine covers all waters navigable in fact, whether fresh or salt.
Under the equal footing doctrine the title to the beds of all navigable
waters, fresh or salt, automatically went to each state at statehood.3 5
As the original thirteen states held title to the beds of navigable
waters, so must each new state hold such title if they are to be on an
equal footing with the original thirteen. Accordingly, analysis of navigability-for-title determines what lands left the federal domain and
passed to the states at statehood. Because state law cannot control the
disposition of the federal domain, the test of navigability-for-title is
necessarily a federal test,3 6 and is determined as of the date the state
entered the union.3 7 The subsequent disposition of these lands is a
matter solely of state law. Prior to statehood the federal government
held title to these lands, which were chiefly valuable for "commerce,
navigation, and fisheries ...in trust for the future states."' 38 The fed-

33. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 435. More contemporary authors contend the public trust
doctrine applied to navigable fresh waters in England too. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
103-05 (Robert E. Clark ed., 1970).
34. Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
35. The equal footing doctrine arises by implication from the United States Constitution, and
provides that new states must be admitted on an equal footing with the original thirteen states.
New states therefore have the same governing powers, including the power of governance over
federal lands, as the original states. New states also acquire, as of the instant of statehood, the
title to the beds of navigable rivers and lakes, because the original thirteen states held such titles.
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
36. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 55 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922).
37. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Utah, 283 U.S. at 75.
The Court described the test for navigability-for-title at the time of statehood in Holt State BankThe rule long since approved by this Court in applying the Constitution and laws of the
United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as
navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water; and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such
use is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an
absence of occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream
in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.
270 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted).
38. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1894).
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eral government could convey these beds away only in case of some
"international duty or public exigency." 9
At a minimum the public trust doctrine protects the public interest
in the beds of navigable waters, up to mean high tide on the ocean, and
mean high water mark on fresh waters.4 No use can be made of the
beds of such waters without meeting conditions imposed by the doctrine. Beyond this, other states have interpreted the doctrine as applying to waters that are only navigable for recreational uses, even though
the beds are privately owned.4" In other words, in some courts the
public trust doctrine is not limited to those waters and beds which the
state owns, or once owned, under the equal footing doctrine.
Federal courts have had little occasion to speak about the parameters of the doctrine, with the exception of Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois,42 and recently, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi4 3 The
task of defining the scope of the doctrine has been left largely to state
courts. California and Massachusetts have developed the doctrine
more extensively than most states, with Wisconsin, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Michigan, and a few other states not far behind.' The doctrine has not been totally rejected in any state, although its application
varies state by state and its application to particular facts has been
denied.4 5
Courts around the country have employed the public trust doctrine
in literally hundreds of cases in recent years.4 6 Several trends are
apparent. First, courts are applying the doctrine in new geographical
contexts in order to reach and promote new interests. In particular,
courts are finding and preserving public access to coast and shorelines.47 A second important trend is the use of the doctrine as a
method of environmental protection.4 8
39. Id. at 50. These duties include performance of international obligations, such as
improvements to facilitate commerce with foreign nations or among the states. Id. at 48.
40. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Most states extend public
trust rights from the seaward limit of the territorial sea to the mean high tide line. A handful of
states, however, only recognize full public trust protection seaward of the low tide line. These
states include Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See DAVID C.
SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 59 n.22 (1990).
41. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
42. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
43. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
44. See generally infra part III.
45. See, eg., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); MacGibbon v. Board of
Appeals, 340 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 1976); O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 235 A.2d I (N.J. 1967).
46. See, e.g., SLADE et al., supra note 40, at 25.
47. See, e.g., Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 496 (Alaska 1988); Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 360-63 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
48. See, e.g., infra part III.C.I.

532

Public Trust Doctrine
Finally, coastal resource managers and state agencies are beginning
to incorporate the public trust doctrine into the administrative decision-making process. State officials must identify both known and
potential parameters of the doctrine, and determine the extent to
which current regulatory decisions should be scrutinized for adherence to public trust values. Officials must also determine whether any
past decisions are subject to public trust review as well.4 9
.

ChronologicalDevelopment of the Public Trust Doctrine in
Washington Law

Washington courts have only recently explicitly addressed the public trust doctrine in state cases. Nonetheless, the public trust has
existed in Washington since statehood, and burdens all public trust
resources, including tidelands, shorelands, and beds of navigable
waters, as well as the waters themselves. Certain uses of these
resources are specially protected by the doctrine, including navigation,
commercial fisheries, and "incidental rights of fishing, boating, swim' 50
ming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes."
Because the public trust doctrine is dynamic and may change with
contemporary needs, the scope of the doctrine will probably expand in
the future.5 1 This part traces the development and current status of
the doctrine in Washington law, constitutional, judicial, and statutory.
L

Constitution

Prior to and at the time of statehood, tidelands and shorelands
fronting harbor areas were areas of intensive economic development
and interest. Following much lobbying and debate, the state constitutional convention approved three articles addressing ownership and
management of the new state's tidelands and shorelands.5 2 Each of
these articles has direct bearing on the scope of the state's public trust
powers and obligations.
First, the state constitution declares state ownership of the beds and
shores of all navigable waters, except where a federal patent was per49. See, eg., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
50. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (quoting
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316,462 P.2d 232, 239 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878
(1970)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
51. See infra part III for a detailed analysis of the current scope of the public trust doctrine.
52. Kenan R. Conte, The Disposition of Tidelands and Shorelands, Washington State Policy
1889-1982, at 10-20 (1982) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, Evergreen State College).
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fected prior to statehood.5 3 Second, the constitution invalidated prior
acts of the territorial legislature granting tidelands to railroad companies and establishing riparian rights.5 4 Finally, the constitution established harbor boundaries, and placed a restraint on disposition of beds
underlying navigable waters outside of certain harbor lines.5 5 Article
XV directed the legislature to provide for the appointment of a commission to draw harbor lines in the navigable waters that lie within or
in front of the corporate limits of any city, or within one mile on either
side. The state may not alienate any rights whatever in the waters
beyond such harbor lines. Areas lying between harbor lines and the
line of ordinary high water, within specified limits, are reserved for
landings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of navigation and
commerce.5 6 The public policy expressed in these constitutional provisions is generally consistent with public trust principles: reserving
complete state ownership in the beds and shores of navigable waters.5 7
The constitution did not, however, prohibit the sale of tidelands and
shorelands. Instead, the state was permitted to dispose of first class
tide5" and shorelands, 59 which it did under statutory authorization

53. WASH. CONST. art. XVII. See infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text for a discussion
of pre-statehood grants.
54. WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, § 2.
55. Id. art. XV.
56. Id. art. XV, §§ 1, 2; see also Ralph W. Johnson & Eileen M. C~oney, HarborLines and
the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington Navigable Waters, 54 WASH. L. REv. 275 (1978).
57. For further discussion of the interrelationship between the statutory harbor line system
and the public trust doctrine, see infra part II.B.3.b.i.
58. The term "first class tidelands" means the shores of navigable tidal waters belonging to
the state, lying within or in front of the corporate limits of any city, or within one mile thereof
upon either side and between the line of ordinary high tide and the inner harbor line, and within
two miles of the corporate limits on either side and between the line of crdinary high tide and the
line of extreme low tide. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 79.90.030 (West 1991).
59. "First class shorelands" means the shores of a navigable lake or river belonging to the
state, not subject to tidal flow, lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of
navigability, or the inner harbor line where established and within or in front of the corporate
limits of any city or within two miles thereof upon either side. Id. § 79.90.040.
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until 1971 . Second class tide6 ' and shorelands6 2 continue to be eligible for sale only to public entities.6 3
2.

Cases

Early Washington cases, although not relying explicitly on the public trust doctrine, recognized legally protectable public interests in the
state's navigable waters and underlying beds." In Hill v. Newell," the
court explicitly approved the reasoning of the leading California public trust case.66 In State v. Sturtevant,6 7 the court acknowledged that
the state held the right of navigation "in trust for the whole people" of
this state.6 8 The court did not expressly use the term "public trust" in
Wilbour v. Gallagher,69 but it gave strong protection to the public
right of navigation, one of the interests traditionally protected under
the public trust doctrine. Explicit judicial recognition of the public
trust doctrine in Washington occurred in 1987, in Caminiti v. Boyle.7 °
Principles and policies of the doctrine are evident in Washington
state law, however, going back as far as 1891. One line of early cases
examined the nature of the state's ownership of tidelands and the beds
of navigable waters. The Washington Supreme Court concluded in a
series of decisions over several decades that the state owned these
lands in fee, and that entry into statehood extinguished all riparian
rights of adjacent landowners to navigable waters.71 This proprietary
ownership, as contrasted with sovereign trusteeship, enabled the state
60. For additional historical information, see Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 410 P.2d 20
(1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
61. "Second class tidelands" means the shores of navigable tidal waters belonging to the state,
lying outside of and more than two miles from the corporate limits of any city, and between the
line of ordinary high tide and the line of extreme low tide. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.035
(West 1991).
62. "Second class shorelands" means the shores of a navigable lake or river belonging to the
state, not subject to tidal flow, lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of
navigability, and more than two miles from the corporate limits of any city. Id. § 79.90.045.
63. Id. § 79.94.150(2). For an account of the controversy surrounding the enactment of this
statute, see Conte, supra note 52, at 170-84.
64. Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 419, 82 P. 718, 719 (1905);
Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 275, 75 P. 807, 809 (1904).
65. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
66. People ex rel Webb v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913). The Washington
Supreme Court noted that the reasoning of the California court expressed the Washington
court's own views. Hill, 86 Wash. at 231, 149 P. at 952.
67. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913), aff'd on reh'g 86 Wash. 1, 149 P. 33 (1915).
68. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037.
69. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
70. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988). For further
discussion of Caminiti, see infra part III.D.
71. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 249, 26 P. 539, 542 (1891).
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to dispose of tidelands, in fee, as provided by statute.7 2 But, the state
conveyed only the bare legal title, leaving the pubic trust in place.
A parallel line of cases at this time examined both the nature of the
state's disposition of tidelands and the remaining public interests in
the lands and waters above them. In Eisenbach v. Hatfield, the court
cited public interests in preservation of navigation and fishing as a
limit on private ownership of submerged lands. 73 New Whatcom v.
FairhavenLand Co. analogized the state's ownership of lands to that
exercised by the king of England, and described the public's interest as
"an easement in [all navigable waters] for the purposes of travel."'7 4
Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge75 acknowledged a public right to
navigable waters and fisheries, but denied a public right of clamming
on privately leased lands between the high and low water marks. 6
In State v. Sturtevant the Washington Supreme Court commented
that the state was charged only with preserving the public interest in
navigation following grant of shorelands into private ownership.77 On
rehearing, the court left open the question whethe: a public right to
fisheries was reserved out of tideland grants. 8 Concurrently, the
court decided two cases explicitly discussing the public interests
remaining in tidelands 79 and an abandoned navigable riverbed 80 conveyed into private ownership. The court found all public interests to
have been extinguished.
Two important points emerge from these cases. First, the Washington legislature early followed a strong public policy encouraging private ownership of tidelands and concomitant development and
industrial expansion. The Washington Supreme Court implicitly
approved this policy in its decisions.8 " Second, although the court did
not use the term "public trust doctrine" when analyzing these cases, it
did invoke the leading public trust doctrine cases of the day, including
72. Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 89, 102 P. 1041, 1043 (1909);
Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542, 549, 103 P. 833, 836 (1909).
73. Eisenbach, 2 Wash. at 253, 26 P. at 544.
74. New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 504, 64 P. 735, 739 (1901).
75. 49 Wash. 127, 94 P. 922 (1908).
76. For a discussion of the current state of this issue, see infra part III.C.2.a.
77. State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 165, 135 P. 1035, 1037 (1913), aff'don reh'g 86 Wash.
1, 149 P. 33 (1915).
78. State v. Sturtevant, 86 Wash. 1, 149 P. 33 (1915).
79. Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909).
80. Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
81. See, ag., Harris v. Hylebos Indus., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 770, 787, 505 P.2d 457, 467 (1973);
Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 89, 102 P. 1041, 1044 (1909).
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Illinois Central 2 and People ex rel. Webb v. CaliforniaFish Co.,8 3 as
authority for its analysis. The court did not, however, apply the presumption against destruction of public trust interests that is the hallmark of contemporary public trust cases. Instead, particularly with
Palmer v. Peterson 4 and Hill v. Newell,"5 the court engaged in perfunctory review of the statutes enabling the grants at issue, and their
negative impact on public trust interests.86
Wilbour v. Gallagher 7 marks the modem genesis of public trust
doctrine decisions in Washington. The court found that a shoreland
owner's right to develop intermittently submerged property was circumscribed by the public interest in navigation at high water. The
thirteenth footnote, where the court encouraged a more systematic
method of permitting fill, is particularly significant.8" This footnote is
generally thought to have inspired the Shoreline Management Act of
1971.89
Nevertheless, doctrinal development of the public trust remained
inconsistent even after Wilbour. The court in Harrisv. Hylebos Industries, Inc.9o found that the "legislative intent regarding the use of tide82. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), cited in Palmer, 56 Wash. at 76, 105 P.
at 186.
83. 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913), cited in Hill, 86 Wash. at 231-32, 149 P. at 952.
84. 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909).
85. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
86. This problem continues. Recently, Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals
avoided its review obligations by concluding, without significant analysis, that public trust
interests were extinguished in certain tidelands because the tidelands were granted into private
hands prior to statehood. See Reed v. State, No. 25106-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Div. One May 21,
1990), petitionfor review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1028, 803 P.2d 324 (1990).
87. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969).
88. Id. at 316 n.13, 462 P.2d at 239 n.13. The note states:
We are concerned at the absence of any representation in this action by the Town or
County of Chelan, or of the State of Washington, all of whom would seem to have some
interest and concern in what, if any, and where, if at all, fills and structures are to be
permitted (and under what conditions) between the upper and lower levels of Lake Chelan.
There undoubtedly are places on the shore of the lake where developments, such as those of
the defendants, would be desirable and appropriate. This presents a problem for the
interested public authorities and perhaps could be solved by the establishment of harbor
lines in certain areas within which fills could be made, together with carefully planned
zoning by appropriate authorities to preserve for the people of this state the lake's
navigational and recreational possibilities. Otherwise there exists a new type of privately
owned shorelands of little value except as a place to pitch a tent when the lands are not
submerged.
Id.
89. For a discussion of how the court's decision in Wilbour prompted the legislature to pass
the Shoreline Management Act, see Geoffrey Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management
Act of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REv. 423, 425-27 (1974).
90. 81 Wash. 2d 770, 505 P.2d 457 (1973).
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lands in harbors of cities is manifestly that... such harbors.., shall
consist of commercial waterways, and that the filling and reclaiming of
the tidelands... shall be encouraged." 9 1 The court did note that the
recently enacted Shoreline Act was not argued in the case as evidence
of a legislative policy reversal.9 2
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly
addressed the role of the public trust doctrine in Washington's coastal
management in two cases. In Caminitiv. Boyle,9 3 the court found that
the public trust doctrine had always existed in Washington law.9 4 The
case involved interpretation of a statute that granted a revocable
license to waterside owners to build private recreational docks on
state-owned tidelands and shorelands.9 5 The court, while acknowledging the power and extent of the public trust doctrine, found the statute
not inconsistent with public trust interests in navigable waters.9 6
The court in Orion Corp. v. State 97 made affirmative use of the public trust doctrine in curtailing development of privately owned land
where the fills and housing would conflict with public interests in navigable waters. While the state clearly had the power to dispose of tidelands and shorelands, that disposition was not unqualified. Rather, it
was subject to the paramount public right of navigation and fisheries.98
Orion is particularly noteworthy for its analysis of a constitutional takings claim. The tidelands owner argued that its property had been
taken without just compensation as required by the state and federal
constitutions. The court found that the owner had no right to make
use of his property in a way that would impair public trust rights.
"Since a 'property right must exist before it can be taken,'" the court
concluded that no taking had occurred by preventing dredging or filling.99 The court, however, remanded the case to the trial court to
91. Id. at 786, 505 P.2d at 466.
92. Id. at n.ll.
93. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988). For a more
detailed description of this case, see infra notes 308-21 and accomparying text.
94. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994. Caminitiinvolved state-owned land, and
focused on management of state land consistent with the doctrine rather than regulation of
private land. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 995.
95. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.105 (West 1991). Abutting residential owners may
maintain docks without charge if such docks are used exclusively for private recreational
purposes and the area is not subject to prior rights. Permission is subject to local regulation and
may be revoked by the state upon a finding of public necessity. Id.
96. Caminitd, 107 Wash. 2d at 674, 732 P.2d at 997.
97. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 642, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
For a more detailed description of this case, see infra notes 371-75 arid accompanying text.
98. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072 (citing Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 667, 732
P.2d at 993).
99. Id. at 641-42, 747 P.2d at 1073 (citing Crooks, supra note 89, at 456).

Public Trust Doctrine
consider whether there were any profitable uses that would have been
consistent with the public's rights." °
In DraperMachine Works v. Department of Natural Resources,10 1
the court touched briefly on the public trust doctrine again. Draper
involved a rental dispute between the Department of Natural
Resources and a marina owner. The owner argued that the Department had no authority to rent submerged lands because they are held
by the state in its sovereign capacity, or in trust for the people."2 A
private marina trying to avoid rental obligations was obviously not a
sympathetic proponent of the public trust doctrine. The court only
discussed this claim in a perfunctory manner. Rather than carefully
scrutinizing the public trust issue, the court largely deferred to the
legislature.

10 3

These cases indicate that the public trust doctrine has been adopted
into Washington law, but has not yet been fully delineated. They do,
however, suggest both the analytic foundations and the direction for
future development of the doctrine.
3. Legislation
To what extent do legislative enactments, addressing coastal
resource management, embody and even supplant the public trust doctrine? The public trust doctrine represents two distinct concepts.
First, the judicial function is expanded, from its usual rational basis
review, to a more rigorous scrutiny of legislative and administrative
acts. Second, when engaged in this review, the courts compare challenged laws or governmental actions with specific values, i.e., public
interests in navigation, commerce, fisheries, and other uses of trust
resources.
a. JudicialReview Function
Usually the judiciary will defer to legislative judgment when reviewing statutes. If a court can find a rational basis for a challenged statute, it will decline to substitute its own judgment for that of the
100. Id. at 662, 747 P.2d at 1084-85.
101. 117 Wash. 2d 306, 318, 815 P.2d 770, 777 (1991).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 318-19, 815 P.2d at 777-78. For example, the court wrote: "respondent's
argument relating to 'reservation' and sovereign and proprietary capacities only obscures the real
point of the inquiry: Whether the Legislature intended in RCW 79.93.040 to allow DNR to
collect rent for the use of certain portions of waterways." Id. at 318, 815 P.2d at 777.
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legislature." ° The courts make an exception to this deferential review,
however, when certain constitutional issues are implicated. Courts
will, for example, strictly scrutinize statutes that implicate certain fundamental rights or affect equal protection.10 5
The public trust doctrine invites another form of heightened judicial
scrutiny, not necessarily based on constitutional foundations"° 6 but on
historical common law traditions and the unique value and importance of navigable waters and coastlines.10 7 Thus, the courts have
used the public trust doctrine to carefully examine statutes for consistency with public trust principles. Rather than deferring solely to legislative judgment about coastal management, the doctrine enables
courts to compare that judgment with public trust values.10 8
Presumably, a statute cannot even preclude the traditional heightened scrutiny that the public trust doctrine requires. Because the public trust doctrine is a judicially created law that may be invoked by
judicial notice, the legislature cannot divest the courts of their responsibility to consider the public trust doctrine. Neither can the judiciary
relinquish its public trust doctrine obligations. In other words, while
the public trust doctrine may not direct the outcome of any given case,
it does require courts to take a stronger than usual look at legislation
that may negatively impact public trust interests.

104. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); State v. Brayman, 110 Wash. 2d 183,
193, 751 P.2d 294, 299 (1988).
105. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating statute
limiting school desegregation as a violation of equal protection); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating housing ordinance that in effect prohibited some
family members from living together in the same dwelling unit); Macias v. Department of Labor
& Indus., 100 Wash. 2d 263, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983) (invalidating statute requiring seasonal
workers to earn $150 from each employer to qualify for worker's compensation as a violation of
equal protection, because statute penalized, in effect, the employee's fundamental right to travel).
106. Although courts in other states have so implied. See Harrison Dunning, Instream
Flows, The Public Trust, and the Future of the West, Address at Instream Flow Protection in
the Western United States: A Practical Symposium 3 (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1988) (on file with the
Washington Law Review).
107. See generallysupra part II.A.
108. See, ag., Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 670, 732 P.2d 989, 994-95 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 88 (Cal.
1913); Sax, supra note 20, at 489-90. Courts also use the doctrine as a rule of construction to
determine legislative intent. They attempt to construe legislation in a manner consistent with the
doctrine. See State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1989).
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b. Statutes
L HarborLine System

The constitutionally mandated harbor line system' °9 gave rise to the
first state statutes addressing public trust interests. The harbor line
system provides for state ownership and management of all lands lying
outside of established harbor lines. The proprietary interest reflected
in the constitutional articles providing for the system, 110 and the
implementing statutes,'1 1 clearly embody the public trust interest in
these lands. The geographical scope of the public trust doctrine
exceeds that of the harbor line system. As Johnson & Cooney noted:
The existence of the [public trust] doctrine in Washington is important because... harbor lines have been established in only a small percentage of the state's waters, and even where harbor lines do exist, they
do not perfectly reflect contemporary public values in navigation and in
the beds of navigable waters. The public 112
trust doctrine may be available
to protect these values in a proper case.
There is some correlation between the purposes of the harbor line
system and the public trust doctrine. The harbor line system serves to
limit the uses of harbor areas to "landings, wharves, streets, and other
conveniences of navigation and commerce." 113 These purposes mandate public use of the harbor area and in fact embody historic public
trust uses.
Nothing in the Washington harbor line system... should be taken to
negate the public trust doctrine in this state .... [T]he harbor line
system has reduced the need for reliance on the public trust doctrine and
has, at least until recently, given adequate protection to many of the
same public interests 14which otherwise would have received public trust
doctrine protection.
While the harbor line system seeks to reserve and retain public control and access over important commercial waterfronts, it is not clear
how other public trust interests, such as fisheries and recreation,
would fare in conflict with the harbor line system. State policy during
the first eight decades of statehood clearly favored disposition of tidelands and shorelands into private ownership, 1 5 a policy contemplated
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
Id. art. XVII. See supra part II.B.I.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90 (West 1991).
Johnson & Cooney, supra note 56, at 287.
WASH. CoNsT. art XV, § 1.

114. Johnson & Cooney, supra note 56, at 286-87.
115. See Conte, supra note 52, at x, 25-66.
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and advanced by the harbor line system. Several statutes delineated
the functions of the Harbor Line Commission and established pro1 16
grams for the sale of tidelands and leases of navigable water beds.
In 1971, the state legislature halted further sales of tidelands and
shorelands into private ownership." 7 By that time, however, approximately sixty percent of all tidelands and thirty percent of all shorelands were, and remain, privately owned. 118 Importantly, this private
ownership does not extinguish public trust interests.
iL

Shoreline Management Act

In 1971, the state legislature enacted the Shoreline Management
Act. 119 The Shoreline Act establishes a management scheme and ethic
for local12 comprehensive planning and land use control for all shorelines of the state. Its coverage extends from extreme low tide to two
hundred feet inland from the high water mark. 2 Wetlands are also
covered.122 It excludes all streams and rivers with flows less than
123
twenty cubic feet per second and all lakes less than twenty acres.
Many of these waters and underlying lands are public trust resources.
Whether the doctrine extends to cover all of the lands and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the Shoreline Act is a question yet unan124
swered by the Washington courts.
The Shoreline Act reflects a legislative intent to protect public trust
resources. The statute designs a land use program that governs both
state-owned and private lands that fall under its jurisdiction. 125 The
Act emphasizes preservation of these waters for public access and
water-related or water-dependent uses, and promotes environmental
and aesthetic values.126
116. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. titles 43 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991), 53 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991), 79 (West 1991).
117. Act of May 21, 1971, ch. 217, § 2, 1971 Wash. Laws Ist Extraordinary Session 217, 218
(codified at WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 79.94.150) (West 1991).
118. Conte, supra note 52, at x.
119. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, ch. 286, 1971 Wash. Laws 1st Extraordinary
Session 1496 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.58 (West Supp. 1991)).
120. The state retains power of approval over local master programs to insure consistency
with the policies of the Act. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.58.090 (West Supp. 1991).
121. Id. § 90.58.030(2)(a)(f).
122. Id. § 90.58.030(2)(f).
123. Id. §§ 90.58.030(2)(d)(ii)-(iii).
124. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
125. This authority may be contrasted with that of other statutes that provide authority only
over state-owned lands. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 79.90 (West 1991) (Aquatic Lands
Act).
126. Id. § 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991).
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The Shoreline Act's goals and functions are far broader than those
of the public trust doctrine. The Act establishes a process for comprehensive planning to guide the future of Washington shorelines, balancing development and preservation of public rights.127 Certain public
trust values are reflected in the Act's legislative findings, use preferences, and guidelines for master program contents. 128 The Orion court
observed that the Shoreline Act reflects public trust principles in its
underlying policy of" 'protecting against adverse effects to the public
health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the
state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally public rights of
navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto.' "129
While the Shoreline Act represents an exercise of state regulatory
power, the public trust doctrine supplements execution of the Act.
When regulatory power is applied to trust resources, limiting them to
specific trust uses, no takings issue arises. Private land is subject to the
trust burden, which predates virtually all private ownership. A takings issue can arise, however, if regulations exceed public trust protections. For example, the Orion court found that the public trust
easement on the tidelands at issue precluded their fill and residential
development. The tidelands could, however, be used for aquacultural
activities under the public trust burden, but not under the Shoreline
Act. If aquaculture were a profitable use, the court concluded that
Orion Corporation could claim a regulatory taking of its tidelands
equal to their value as an aquaculture site, but not for other development.1 30 Thus, the public trust doctrine effectively shields the state's
regulatory actions from takings claims, where those actions mirror the
scope of the doctrine.
Although the Orion court clearly distinguished between the public
trust doctrine and the Shoreline Act, earlier cases indicate the doctrine
was nearly merged into the Act. The court in Caminiti noted that
"the requirements of the 'public trust doctrine' are fully met by the
legislatively drawn controls imposed by the Shoreline Management

Act of 197 1.'131 Previously, the court observed that "any common127. Id.
128. Id. §§ 90.58.020, .090.
129. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641 n.11, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.11 (1987)
(citing Portage Bay-Roanoke Park Community Council v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 92 Wash. 2d
1, 4, 593 P.2d 151, 153 (1979) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020) (West Supp.
1991)), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
130. Id. at 660-62, 747 P.2d at 1083-85. The court remanded for factfinding on this issue.
131. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 670, 732 P.2d 989, 995 (1987) (citing Portage BayRoanoke Park Community Council v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 92 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 593 P.2d 151,
153 (1979)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988). Nevertheless, the residential preference cited as
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law public benefit doctrine this state may have had prior to 1971 has
been superseded and the SMA [Shoreline Management Act] is the
'
In Orion, however, the public
present declaration of that doctrine." 132
trust doctrine made a strong reappearance as something distinct from
the Shoreline Act. Thus, while the Shoreline Act may reflect elements
and policies of the public trust doctrine, it does not supersede it.
iii.

Waters Resources Act

The Water Resources Act of 1971133 (WRA) promulgates state policy governing the "utilization and management of the waters of the
state," providing guidelines and priorities for allocation and use of primarily freshwater bodies, especially rivers. This statute represents an
intersection between the prior appropriation"' and public trust doc135
trines, and is explicitly binding on local governments and agencies.
While the statute does not address navigation interests, it does cite
environmental quality, particularly with respect to wildlife, as a priority in water allocation.1 36 The statute also implies a requirement of
137
base flows to support navigation.
The WRA covers all waters contained in lakes and streams in
Washington, and groundwater resources, most of which are public
trust resources. 138 Waters in navigable lakes and streams are clearly
protected by the public trust doctrine. 139 Waters that are only recreationally navigable may also be subject to the doctrine. 1'4 Undertheir use
ground waters are not protected by the doctrine, unless
141
affects the quantity or quality of surface water resources.
authoritative in Portage Bay is, arguably, in conflict with public access goals of the public trust
doctrine, even though the Shoreline Act cites residential preference as facilitating public access.
For a discussion of the court's deference to the legislature in Draper Machine Works, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 117 Wash. 2d 306, 318, 815 P.2d 770, 777 (1991), see supra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
132. PortageBay, 92 Wash. 2d at 4, 593 P.2d at 153 (citation omitted).
133. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020 (West Supp. 1991).
134. The prior appropriation system is a common law system of water allocation based on the
principle of first in time, first in right. See Avery v. Johnson, 59 Wash. 332, 109 P. 1028 (1910).
135. WAsH. REV.CODE ANN. § 90.54.090.
136. Id. § 90.54.020(3).
137. Id. § 90.54.020(3)(a).
138. Id § 90.54.020 (providing management and guidelines for "the waters of the state").
139. See infra part III.B.1.
140. See infra part III.B.2.e.
141. Appropriation of water from sources not traditionally within the scope of the public
trust doctrine can violate the doctrine if the appropriation impairs trust resources. See, ag.,
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal.) (applying public trust
doctrine to non-navigable tributaries where diversion had harmed public trust resources), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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The WRA's function is to provide policy guidance on the use of
state waters, such that they are "protected and fully utilized for the
greatest benefit to the people of the state." 4 2 A number of the Act's
administrative guidelines are clearly congruent with public trust values, although important exemptions exist. For example, the Act seeks
to protect water quality and explicitly requires consideration of base
flows in lakes and streams in order to protect environmental quality
and fish and wildlife resources.1 43 It also, however, provides for a
variety of other uses, private and public, and exempts existing water
rights from the policies of the Act.1" Public trust values are in fact
only a few of the many interests to be considered.
The Water Code of 1917145 is the basic water appropriation code in
Washington, and created the process for establishing priorities among
various diverters. The Water Code is potentially inconsistent with the
public trust doctrine in that it purports to issue consumptive water use
rights that sometimes damage and destroy public trust interests by not
requiring minimum stream flow. The public trust doctrine, or the
interests protected by that doctrine, were not discussed or considered
when the code was adopted. Because no explicit intent to abolish the
public trust doctrine is evident in the 1917 Code, or permits issued
thereunder, the public trust doctrine
should still be applicable to prior
146
appropriation water rights.
iv. State EnvironmentalPolicy Act
The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA)14 7 was the
third in the trilogy of environmental statutes enacted in that year.
SEPA is designed to achieve a balance between resource utilization
and environmental protection through evaluation of state and local
governmental activities. This evaluation provides a comprehensive
analysis of development activities and their impacts in light of potential environmental impacts. The use of and impacts on public trust
resources are only one element to be considered in environmental evaluations under SEPA. Nevertheless, the statute substantively guarantees aesthetic and environmental quality to the state's residents. These
142.
143.
144.
145.
ANN. §
146.
permits
147.

WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.54.010(2).
Id. § 90.54.120(2).
Id. § 90.54.900.
Act of March 14, 1917, ch. 117, 1917 Wash. Laws 447 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
90.03 (West 1962 & Supp. 1991)).
For a discussion of the retroactive effect of the public trust doctrine on water diversion
in California, see infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
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rights are congruent with those protected by the public trust doctrine,
and public trust jurisprudence may support claims to environmental
quality of trust resources made through the SEPA process.
v. Aquatic Lands Act
In 1982, the legislature enacted the Aquatic Lands Act (ALA), consolidating a number of separate statutes relating to the lease and sale
of state-owned tidelands and shorelands. 14 s The ALA covers a significant portion of public trust lands. Aquatic lands are defined as "all
state-owned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters." 14' 9 The scope of the common law public trust doctrine
differs in that it also embraces privately-owned aquatic lands, and may
extend further inland than the line of high water and high tide. 5
The ALA is a prime example of legislation providing for management of state-owned public trust resources ina manner consistent with
the doctrine. The ALA recites the great value of aquatic lands and
requires that they be managed to benefit the public. 5 The Act provides guidelines prioritizing use of aquatic lands: public use and
access, water-dependent use, environmental protection, and renewable
resource use are the most important public benefits to be promoted. 152
State-wide interests are preferred over local interests. Non-waterdependent uses are permitted only under exceptional circumstances,
where compatible with water-dependent uses. When evaluating tideland lease proposals, the managing agency, the state Department of
Natural Resources, is instructed to consider the natural values of the
land as wildlife habitat, natural area preserve, representative ecosysleasing where it finds the
tem, or spawning area, and it may withhold
1 53
values.
natural
lands have significant
1 54
A specific provision of the ALA was at issue in Caminiti v. Boyle,
the first case in which the Washington Supreme Court explicitly
acknowledged the public trust doctrine as a part of Washington law.
The petitioners challenged a state statute that allows owners of residential property abutting state-owned tidelands and shorelands to
install and maintain private recreational docks on such lands without
148. Act of April 3, 1982, ch. 21, 1982 Wash. Laws 1st Extraordinary Sess. 1115 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 79.90-.96 (West 1991)). The ALA was revised in 1984.
Act of March 27, 1984, ch. 221, 1984 Wash. Laws 1129.
149. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.010 (West 1991).
150. See infra part III.B.2.
151. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.450.
152. Id. § 79.90.455.
153. Id. § 79.90.460(3).
154. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
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payment to the state.155 The court found a harmony between the challenged statute and the Shoreline Act, which it cited as a legislative
manifestation of the public trust doctrine.1 56 The court upheld the
ALA provision at issue, finding it was not in conflict with public trust
15 7
values.
vi. Seashore Conservation Act
The most recent legislative protection for public trust resources was
enacted in the 1988 amendments to the Seashore Conservation Act
(SCA). 5 8 Originally enacted in 1967, the SCA explicitly dedicates
Washington state ocean beaches to public recreation. The function of
the statute is to preserve this public trust resource for public use in
perpetuity. The SCA declares that "[t]he ocean beaches within the
Seashore Conservation Area are ... declared a public highway and
shall remain forever open to the use of the public." 15 9 The legislature
based this policy on the increasing public pressure for recreational use
of the ocean beaches," 6 including swimming, surfing, hiking, hunting,
fishing, clamming, and boating. General public recreational use is
anticipated, but the statute also expresses some priorities. For example, most of the beaches shall be available only for pedestrians, not
motor vehicles. 16 1 Management of these lands is vested under the
jurisdiction of the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission. The Seashore Conservation Act expresses the policies of the
public trust doctrine, and provides rules and a system of management
for these important state lands for the public benefit.
C. Summary
The public trust doctrine has applied to all pertinent lands in Washington since statehood. Early cases referenced trust interests without
explicitly calling them such. Recently, the Washington Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized the doctrine. The state constitution
also identifies and promotes the state's interests in public trust
155. WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 79.95.105 (West 1991).
156. In particular, the court noted that the priorities under the Shoreline Act include " 'single
family residences.., piers, and other improvements facilitating public access to shorelines of the
state.'" Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 671, 732 P.2d at 995 (emphasis by the court) (quoting WAsH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991)).
157. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 674-75, 732 P.2d at 996-97.
158. Act of March 16, 1988, ch. 75, 1988 Wash. Laws 242 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 43.51.650-.765 (West Supp. 1991)).
159. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.51.760 (West Supp. 1991).
160. Id. § 43.51.650.
161. Id. § 43.51.710.
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resources, and provides a basis for legislative manifestations of the
doctrine. Congruence between public trust values and several statutes
governing use of the state's natural resources is common. These statutes havd become increasingly important resource management tools,
and the extent to which they embody or reflect public trust values has
increased over time.
III.

DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, AND POTENTIAL
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE

This part begins by noting that the public trust doctrine is primarily
a state law doctrine with varying degrees of development from state to
state. The following subparts describe the geographical scope of the
doctrine, the interests protected by the doctrine, and actions by the
state and by individuals that are inconsistent with the public trust doctrine. Each of these subparts begins with a discussion of what can
clearly be discerned from Washington case law. The scope of the discussion in each subpart then expands to consider how Washington
courts might develop the doctrine in light of cases from other jurisdictions, state legislative policies, and academic commentary. This
approach is supported by the Washington Supreme Court's reference
1 62
to all of these sources in discussing the public trust doctrine.
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine-Primarilya State Law Doctrine

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated many of the basic
public trust principles in a few Supreme Court decisions, the public
trust doctrine remains primarily a state law doctrine. The Court's
description in Shively v. Bowlby of the variation among state assertions
of title to tidelands is equally applicable to the public trust doctrine:
"there is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; ... each State
has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders
according to its own views of justice and policy.. . . Great caution,
therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another."1 63 Thus one could say that there is not one, but
many, public trust doctrines in America, or at least many different
forms of that doctrine.
Variations in the doctrine from state to state are the product of decisions made after statehood. The original states succeeded to the Eng162. See, eg., Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639-42, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73
(1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
163. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
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lish Crown's sovereign powers over navigable waters.'" Under the
equal footing doctrine, the federal government held such lands in trust
for future states, and granted to each state when it entered the Union
the same ownership interest as the original states. 6 Federal law controls whether waters are navigable-for-title, i.e. navigable so that the
state acquired title at statehood under the equal footing doctrine. 6 6
Subsequent developments in state law, however, control the scope of
the doctrine in each state. 167 Some states have conveyed much of
these lands into private hands, and recognize fairly limited public trust
interests in them.1 68 Other states, such as California and New Jersey,
have been at the forefront in expanding the doctrine.
In addition, there is some support for a federal public trust doctrine
which requires the federal government to act in accordance with trust
principles. This may be important in states where the federal government owns large areas of coastal property. After tracing the growing
preservationist attitude in public land law, one academic authority
said that a federal public trust may exist that places several limits on
federal power by 1) constraining congressional action, 2) constraining
administrative action, 3) providing a rule of construction for federal
legislation that protects trust interests, and 4) forcing the federal government to undertake actions to protect trust resources. 169 Court
decisions have reached varying conclusions about the existence of a
federal public trust doctrine that would constrain management of federal resources.' 70 If there is a federal public trust doctrine, the federal
164. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-11 (1842).
165. See, eg., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23, 229 (1845).
166. Under federal law, navigability-for-title is determined by considering the condition of the
waters at the time the state was admitted to the Union. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10
(1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
167. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
168. Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia recognize that an upland grant from the state
extends seaward to the low water mark. Massachusetts and Maine give upland owners the right
to tidelands out to the low water mark, or to 100 rods from the high water mark, whichever is
less. SLADE et al., supra note 40, at 48 n.60 (1990). Consistent with their preference for private
property, states like Massachusetts and Maine have construed public rights to lands between the
high and low water marks narrowly. See, eg., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me.
1989) (holding that state legislation giving the public a right to use privately owned intertidal
lands for recreation was an unconstitutional taking under both the United States and Maine
constitutions); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (finding a public right
to fish, fowl, and navigate, but no public right of passage on foot); see also infra part III.C.2.a.
169. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in PublicLand Law, 14 U.C. DAViS L.
REV. 269, 307-15 (1980).
170. See, eg., City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 632 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Cal.
1986) (order denying cross motions for summary judgment) and 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) (order denying motions to reconsider) (finding that clause in original conveyance from
state to city barring transfer of the trust lands to private ownership also prohibited the federal
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government may have an obligation to protect pub[ic trust interests in
federal lands.171
A federal doctrine, the navigation servitude, closely parallels the
public trust doctrine. The federal navigation servitude, though not
denominated a federal public trust doctrine, shares common features
with the state doctrine. The navigation servitude imposes a dominant
easement on navigable waters and beds."7 2 One of its primary functions is to justify nonpayment of compensation to private persons who
claim their property interests have been damaged or destroyed by a
government project on navigable waters in aid of navigation. 17 3 The
navigation servitude protects the public interest in navigation and
commerce. It derives from the fact that at statehood the federal government was delegated a servitude under the Constitution's Commerce
Clause which applies to federal projects in aid of navigation on all
navigable waters. Navigability, for purposes of the navigation servitude, is considerably broader than navigation for the equal footing
doctrine.174 States also have navigation servitudes, having delegated
to the federal government only a portion of their reserved sovereign
government from transferring the land to private ownership after it had exercised eminent
domain); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 1981) (finding
dual sovereign nature of public trust when Coast Guard condemned land near Boston Harbor).
But cf United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F. Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding
that when the federal government exercises its power of eminent domain, the state public trust
easement is extinguished).
171. Wilkinson, supra note 169, at 285 n.62 (citing Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376
F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974)); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
172. The navigation servitude, however, applies to waters that are navigable in fact. This is a
broader definition, covering more waters than are covered in the naiigable-for-title test.
173. See, eg., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); see also Ralph W. Johnson,
Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. Rv. 233, 246-48
(1980).
174. As United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408-09 (1940), made
clear, the class of waters that are navigable for purposes of Congress' ommerce power are much
broader than the class of waters that are navigable-for-title. Congres;? commerce power extends
not only to those waters navigable at statehood, but also to those that are capable of being
navigable. Therefore, the federal navigation servitude, based on 03ngress' commerce power,
extends to more waters than does the equal footing doctrine.
The U.S. Supreme Court has even held that the federal navigatioa servitude applies to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, where the purpose of a project was to aid navigation on
the lower, navigable part of a river. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 233
(1960). In GrandRiver Dam the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S. government
owed no compensation for waterpower values in a dam site it had condemned as part of a flood
control and navigation project. Id. But cf United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S.
799, 809 (1950) (granting compensation to farmer whose farm was ruined when the United States
raised the level of the Mississippi, thereby backing up water on the non-navigable tributary on
which the farm lay).
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power over navigation. Some state navigation servitudes, such as
Alaska's, 175 require that the state project be in aid of navigation to
trigger the servitude. Others, such as California,176 apply the servitude even though the state project damages or destroys navigation.
The state navigation servitude is closely related to the public trust doctrine, and may, in fact, be considered a special branch of that doctrine.
All three of these doctrines, the federal navigation servitude, the
state navigation servitude, and the public trust doctrine, reduce the
government's obligation to pay damages for taking or damaging private property. Federal management of navigable waters and their
beds constitutes management of the federal government's own servitude, and is not regulation of private property. In all three situations
the relevant doctrine imposes a pre-existing burden on private
property.
A federal public trust doctrine, if found to exist, would presumably
apply only to federal lands. It would not override state public trust
doctrines as applied to state or private lands, or the interpretation of
the doctrine by state courts. Theoretically, Congress could enact
explicit legislation preempting this field of law, but it has not done so,
1 77
and is unlikely to do so in the future.
The federal consistency requirement of the Coastal Zone Management Act 17 1 may diminish the significance of a federal public trust
doctrine. The consistency requirement shows Congress' explicit intent
to leave coastal management under state control. It obligates federal
agencies and federal permittees to comply with state coastal management programs. State coastal management programs include relevant
state judicial and administrative decisions that define and apply state
property law. 179 This presumably would include the public trust doctrine. The federal government must act consistently with this aspect
of the state coastal management program, as with other aspects of the
state's program. Therefore, the discussion which follows focuses on
the definition and application of Washington's public trust doctrine.

175. Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1196-97 (Alaska 1973).
176. Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel Dept. of Public Works, 432 P.2d 3, 12 (Cal. 1967), cert
denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
177. See infra part V.B.1.
178. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992). See infra part V.B.2.
179. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(6a) (West Supp. 1991).
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B.

The GeographicalScope of the Doctrine

L

The Established GeographicalScope in Washington

As mentioned earlier, under the equal footing doctrine each state
obtained title to the beds of its navigable waters and waters subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides. At statehood Washington asserted in its
state constitution all possible rights under the equal footing doctrine:
The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores
of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and
including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes ....

The state constitution, however, was silent on the issue of the use
and sale of state-owned shorelands and tidelands, leaving that issue to
the politics of future legislatures and to the interpretation to be given
article 17 by the Washington Supreme Court."' Washington State
was eager to encourage growth and development, so it transferred
approximately sixty-one percent of its tidelands and thirty percent of
180. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. In Hughes v. State, the Washington Supreme Court
defined the line of ordinary high tide:
[We deem the word 'ordinary' to be used in its everyday context. Tha 'line of ordinary high
tide' is not to be fixed by singular, uncommon, or exceptionally high tides, but by the
Thus the line of 'ordinary
regular, normal, customary, average, and usual high tides ....
high tide' is the average of all high tides during the tidal cycle.
Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 810, 410 P.2d 20, 26 (1966) rev'd or other grounds, 389 U.S.
290 (1967). The language of the opinion and the diagram the Washington Supreme Court provided in the opinion further suggest that the line of ordinary high tide is synonymous with the
line of vegetation. Id. at 803, 410 P.2d at 22. As Professor Corker noted, the court's decision to
fix the boundary between tidelands and uplands at the vegetation linz lacked both significant
legal precedent and practical justification. Charles E. Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and
to What Extent Is This a FederalQuestion, 42 WASH. L. REv. 33, 43-54 (1966). The Washington court's fixing the boundary between uplands and tidelands at the vegetation line differs from
the federal test announced in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Las Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935). Borax adopted a boundary of the mean high tide established by the average elevation of
all tides as observed at a location through a tidal cycle of 18.6 years. Id. at 27. Professor
Corker's assertion that in case of divergence between these two lines, the vegetation line will
always be inland, appears sound. Corker, supra, at 41 n.29. Thus, the Washington Supreme
Court's interpretation of the term "ordinary high tide" means that through its constitution the
State of Washington asserted ownership up to the level of vegetation, creating a broad area of
publicly owned intertidal lands. As the discussion below indicates, however, natural and manmade changes may affect the state's ownership rights. See infra part III.B.3.a.
Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court recently confirmed a state's right to claim any lands
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, rejecting the argument that public trust lands are only
those beneath navigable waters. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1988).
181. Hughes, 67 Wash. 2d at 805, 410 P.2d at 23.
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' Those
its shorelands into private hands between 1889 and 1979. 82
transfers, however, did not in themselves extinguish thejus publicum,
or public interest, in tidelands and shorelands. Public and private
interests co-exist in those parcels conveyed into private hands,1 8 so
long as these lands are still usable for public trust purposes.
The Washington Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the
geographical scope of the public trust doctrine. The court's opinions
in Orion and Caminitisuggest, however, that the geographical scope of
the public trust doctrine extends at a minimum to the tidelands and
shorelands that the state held title to at the time of statehood.1 84 In
Caminiti, the court may have applied the doctrine to upland owners'
lands for limited purposes when it said that the public must be able to
get around docks built on state-owned tidelands and shorelands 8 5
These cases should not, however, be read as strictly limiting the geographical scope of the doctrine in Washington. No cases have tested
how far the Washington Supreme Court will extend the scope of the
doctrine. In deciding the scope of the doctrine, the courts of our state
would likely consider precedents from other jurisdictions, state legislative policies, and academic commentary.

2. Does the DoctrineApply to Lands Other than Those Under
Navigable-for-Title Waters or Beneath Tidal Waters?
a. Non-Navigable-for-Title Tributaries
The California Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to
cover non-navigable tributaries in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the Mono Lake case). 8 6 Mono Lake is a large, navigable,
scenic lake that sits at the base of the Sierra Nevadas in California.
While this saline lake contains no fish, it does contain brine shrimp,
which are a source of food for large numbers of migratory and nesting
birds. Small islands in the middle of the lake serve as nesting grounds
182. Conte, supra note 52, at x.
183. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 668-69, 732 P.2d 989, 993-94
(1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
184. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 639, 747 P.2d at 1072; Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 666-67, 732
P.2d at 992.
185. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 674, 732 P.2d at 996. The court should logically extend the
application of the doctrine so as to allow portages over private lands to get around obstacles or
dangerous rapids in streams. See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684
P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984), overruled as regards to jury trialissue by Gray v. City of Billings, 689
P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc., v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163
(Mont. 1984).
186. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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for many of these birds. In 1940, the California ]Division of Water
Resources granted Los Angeles a permit to divert water from the nonnavigable tributaries of Mono Lake. Since that time, Los Angeles had
been diverting virtually the entire flow of four of the five non-navigable
tributaries that originally fed the lake. In this hot, arid, region those
diversions had a devastating impact on the lake. By the time the California court heard the case, the surface area of the lake had shrunk by
a third and many of the islands in the lake had become linked to the
187
mainland, exposing the birds to predators.
The plaintiffs in Mono Lake filed suit to enjoin the diversions on the
theory that the public trust protects the shores, bed, and waters of
Mono Lake. Thus, the California Supreme Court squarely faced the
issue of whether public trust principles covered actifities on non-navigable tributaries that affected navigable waters. The court concluded
that the public trust doctrine "protects navigable waters from harm
caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries."18' 8 It follows from
the logic of Mono Lake that California might regulate other types of
upland activities that cause harmful spillover effects on public trust
resources.189 Under this interpretation, upstream pollution and
appropriations of water that reduce the volume, and therefore the
assimilative capacity of public trust resources, would be subject to
state control under the public trust doctrine. The Washington
Supreme Court has not had occasion to address this issue. Other
states have cited the Mono Lake decision favorably, " and academics
have generally praised the decision 9 1 but no public trust decisions
have actually applied (or rejected) the Mono Lake principle to prior
appropriation rights.19 2
187. Id. at 711.
188. Id. at 721.
189. Admittedly, one could just as easily denominate the result of Mono Lake an extension of
the public trust doctrine to upland uses rather than an extension of the geographical scope of the
doctrine.
190. See, eg., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118, 1121 n.15 (Alaska 1988);
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1093-94 (Idaho
1983); State v. Central Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
191. See, eg., Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust A FundamentalDoctrine ofAmerican
Property Law, 19 ENvTL. L. 515, 518 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in
Public Waters, 19 ENvTL. L. 473, 474 (1989); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the
Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source andScope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENrTL. L.
425, 466 (1989).
192. Subsequent California appellate decisions have touched on The relation between the
public trust doctrine and the prior appropriation system. Golden Feather Community Ass'n v.
Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1988) (declining to apply public trust
doctrine to prevent appropriators of a non-navigable tributary of an artificial lake from lowering
the level of the lake), rehg granted, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct. App. 1989); United States v. State
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b. Related Wetlands and Uplands
Recognizing the interconnectedness of water systems and the
importance of wetlands to water quality and wildlife preservation,
courts in some states have extended the public trust doctrine to cover
wetlands and even uplands related to navigable water bodies. For
example, the high court of Massachusetts extended the doctrine to
cover state parks 193 and swamps. 194 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Just v. Marinette County 95 considered a case in which landowners
had filled wetlands without obtaining the necessary permit. The court
recognized that Wisconsin had an active duty under the doctrine to
preserve water quality, and it noted that wetlands serve a vital role in
purifying the waters in the state's lakes and streams. 196 The Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore concluded that filling of wetlands implicated the state's duties under the public trust doctrine.' 97 The
Washington Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly. 198 If
the Washington court follows Wisconsin it might rule that the doctrine covers wetlands and related uplands that affect public trust
interests.
c.

The Dry Sand Area

Courts have employed numerous legal doctrines, including the public trust doctrine, and custom to recognize public rights in the dry
sand area of ocean beaches (i.e. those areas above ordinary high
tide). 19 9 For example, in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association 2o the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that in order for the
public to fully exercise its right to swim and bathe below the mean
high water mark, the public must also have both a right of access and
a right to use the dry sand area of beaches. In other words, in New
Jersey the public is not only entitled to cross private dry sand areas, it
also has the right to sunbathe and generally enjoy recreational activiWater Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201 (Ct. App. 1986) (confirming the Water
Board's authority under the public trust doctrine to supervise appropriators to protect fish and
wildlife).
193. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966).
194. Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969).
195. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
196. Id. at 768.
197. Ia
198. The court did, however, cite Just in Orion. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641
n.10, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.10 (1987), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
199. Other legal theories, such as implied dedication (see Gion v. Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50
(Cal. 1970)), and prescriptive easements have also been used to find public rights, but these are
generally applied only to site-specific locations.
200. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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ties in those areas. The court, however, stopped short of saying that
all dry sand areas will be subject to public rights, by saying that the
extent of the public's rights under the doctrine will depend on the circumstances.20 1 The Oregon Supreme Court recognized public rights
in the dry sand area of all state beaches through the ancient doctrine
of custom in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay.202 The Oregon court listed
a seven-part test to determine whether the public had acquired a customary right to Oregon's ocean beaches. First, the public's use must
be ancient and used "so long 'that the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary.' ,,203 Second, the customary right must be exercised
without interruption.2" Third, the customary use must be peaceable
and free from dispute.20" The fourth requirement is that the customary right be reasonable.2 "6 The fifth requirement, o.trtainty, was satisfied by the visible boundaries of the dry sand area and the character of
the land.20 7 Sixth, the custom must be obligatory, "that is... not left
to the option of each landowner whether or not he will recognize the
public's right to go upon the dry-sand area for recreational purposes. ' ' 2 01 Finally, custom must not be repugnant, or inconsistent,
with other customs or with other laws. 2° The Oregon Supreme Court
found that all seven requirements of the doctrine ol custom had been
satisfied and declared the public's customary right to the dry sand area
of beaches. Courts in other states have also
recognized the doctrine of
2 10
custom as a way to protect public rights.
Other states have recognized the public's rights in the dry sand area
through statutes and state constitutional provisions. For example,
under a Texas statute, all parts of the Gulf of Mexico beach between
the vegetation line and the mean low tide line are subject to the public's right of ingress and egress regardless of private ownership where
the public has acquired a right through prescription, dedication, or
201. Id. at 365.
202. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). The Oregon court relied in part on Native Americans' ancient
use to establish customary public rights.
203. Id at 677 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 76).

204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974); County of
Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61 (Haw. 1973); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093,
1101 (Idaho 1979); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). But cf
Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99 (Conn. 1905).
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continuous right.2 " California's constitution recognizes the public's
right of access to tidelands and shorelands2 1 2
Once again, the Washington Supreme Court has never had the
opportunity to directly address the issue of whether public trust rights
exist in the dry sand areas of beaches in this state.2 13 The Shoreline
Management Act of 1971 clearly favors uses which promote public
access to and recreation along tidelands and shorelands.2 14 A Washington State Attorney General's opinion concludes that the public has
the right to use and enjoy the dry sand area of ocean beaches through
the doctrine of custom recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Thornton.2 15 If the Washington Supreme Court recognized a public
right in the dry sand area of beaches, an additional issue would be the
extent of that right.
Whether the Washington court would go beyond recognizing the
public's right of ingress and egress and recognize public rights in sunbathing and recreating in the dry sand area, as the court did in New
Jersey, is unclear. Alternatively, the Washington Supreme Court
might follow those courts reluctant to expand public access at the
expense of private property.21 6
d.

State Legislation Also Supports a Broad GeographicalScope for
the Public Trust Doctrine

In defining the geographical scope of the public trust doctrine,
Washington courts might also look to the Shoreline Management Act
for legislative policy support. The coverage of the Shoreline Act is
extremely broad, covering all navigable salt water, all navigable-fortitle fresh water, and most waters that are navigable only for pleasure
craft. The Act's coverage extends to all uplands lying within two hundred feet of the high water mark of all navigable waters and most non211. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.011 (West 1978).
212. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4. California courts have recognized this section of the California
Constitution as a codification of the public trust doctrine. Carstens v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 135, 143 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Golden Feather Community Ass'n v.
Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 842 (Ct. App. 1989) (looking to art X, § 4 of the
California Constitution to define the scope of the public trust doctrine).
213. For a discussion of the public's right to walk over privately held tidelands, see infra part
III.C.2.a.
214. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991).
215. Water-Public Lands-Rights of Public to Use Ocean Beaches, Op. Att'y Gen. 27, at
21-22 (December 14, 1970).
216. Maine and Massachusetts probably would not recognize public rights in the dry sand
area. Those states even refuse to recognize a public right to recreate or walk over privately
owned intertidal lands. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Opinion of the Justices,
313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974).
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navigable-for-title waters, both rivers and lakes.2 17 It also covers flood
plains, flood ways, bogs, swamps, and river deltas. 218 Because of an
expansive definition of shorelines, the Act covers shorelines on lakes
2 19
and streams that could not meet the test for navigability-for-title,
and thus covers lands that were never owned by the state under the
equal footing doctrine. The Shoreline Act and the public trust doctrine are distinct, though symbiotically related. 22 ° Recently the court
found it worth noting that public trust principles are reflected in the
Shoreline Act's underlying policies.2 21 This suggests that the legislature is both aware of the public trust doctrine and willing to enact
legislation in furtherance of the goals of the doctrine.
This legislative expression of policy could encourage the Washington court to rule that the public trust doctrine applies to waters navigable only for recreational purposes, where title to the beds are
privately owned and never passed through state ownership.2 22 Extension of the public trust doctrine to the areas covered by the Shoreline
Act could conceivably help control harmful spillover effects from
many non-navigable tributaries and uplands and assure public
access-values that other state courts have considered important when
extending the geographical scope of the public trust doctrine.
All state-owned lands within the coverage of the public trust doctrine are also subject to state management regulations. The Seashore
Conservation Act22 3 is an example. Under this A^t all state-owned
ocean beaches between ordinary high tide and extreme low tide are
declared public highways, forever open to the use of the public. These
217. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.030(2)(f) (West Supp. 1991). The "[o]rdinary high
water mark" itself extends all the way up to the vegetation line. Id § 90.58.030(2)(b).
218. Id. §§ 90.58.030(2)(f)-(g); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-22 (1990).
219. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.58.030(2)(d) provides that shorelines:
means all of the water areas of the state, including reservoirs, and their associated wetlands,
together with the lands underlying them; except (i) shorelines of state-wide significance; (ii)
shorelines on segments of streams upstream of a point where the mean annual flow is twenty
cubic feet per second or less and the wetlands associated with such upstream segments; and
(iii) shorelines on lakes less than twenty acres in size and wetlands associated with such
small lakes.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.58.030(d)(d) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
220. See supra part II.B.3.b.ii.
221. For example, in Orion the court noted: "[WMe have also observed that trust principles are
reflected in the SMA's underlying policy." Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641 n.ll,
747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.l1 (1987) (citing Portage Bay-Roanoke Park Community Council v.
Shorelines Hearings Bd., 92 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 593 P.2d 151, 153 (1979)), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022
(1988).
222. See infra part III.B.2.e.
223. WASH. RIv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.51.650-.765 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); see supra part
II.B.3.b.vi.
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lands are managed by the Washington Parks and Recreation Commission for public recreational purposes. A second example is the extensive Aquatic Lands Act,224 covering all state-owned tidelands,
shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters. 225 This
Act contains detailed instructions for management of these lands by
the state, primarily through the Department of Natural Resources.
Presumably the geographical scope of the public trust doctrine could
be extended to protect lands subject to these regulations from harmful
upland uses.
e.

Rights of Ripariansand the Public to Use the Surfaces of NonNavigable-for-Title Waters

Although public and riparian rights to use the surface of non-navigable-for-title waters are not always denominated as public trust interests, recognition of these rights illustrates an important application of
the concept of public rights, nearly identical in function if not in name,
to public trust rights. As the state's population and the public interest
in recreation continue to grow, rights to use the surface of non-navigable streams and lakes will continue to increase in importance.
Washington cases on riparian and public rights to non-navigable
streams are neither recent nor logically consistent. In Griffith v.
Holman,226 decided in 1900, the court took a dim view of public rights
to boat and fish on non-navigable streams. Plaintiff had placed a wire
fence across the little Spokane River. Defendant cut the fence and
caught fish while floating across plaintiff's property. Accepting plaintiff's trespass theory, the state supreme court upheld the trial court's
award of $250 for damaging the fence, and $250 for the fish-no small
award in those days.2 27 Paradoxically, a year later the court recognized the right of loggers to float their logs down non-navigable
22
streams in Watkins v. Dorris.2 28 More recently, in Snively v. Jaber,
the court held that riparians and their licensees have the right to use
the entire surface of non-navigable-for-title lakes.230 Although this
224. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 79.90 (West 1991); see supra part II.B.3.b.v.
225. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.010.
226. 23 Wash. 347, 63 P. 239 (1900).
227. Later, in Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), the court said that the
Griffith decision was based on a fencing statute.
228. 24 Wash. 636, 64 P. 840 (1901).
229. 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
230. For a long while the state's Department of Wildlife followed a policy of obtaining
waterfront lots along non-navigable lakes, thereby becoming riparians and opening up lakes to
public use. But there are limits to this practice, as the court indicated in Botton v. State, 69
Wash. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966). There, the court held that although the state may admit the
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appears different from saying that the public has a right to use the
surface of these waters, any difference is more apparent than real.
According to Snively, riparians, and their licensees, can use these lake
surfaces. Licensees include anyone who has the riparian's permission,
whether that permission is obtained by fee, or for free.2 31 The state is
a riparian if it acquires an access road to a lake. The state can allow
the public as licensees to use this access. Those public users are thus
licensees of a riparian. If the law said the public has a right to use
these waters, this public right would only be available to those who
could get onto the lake without trespassing on private property.2 32
Once again, public access depends on riparian license.

These inconsistencies in Washington lake and stream law can best
be explained in terms of the social and economic needs of the time.2 33
Supporting logging operations has been important since the earliest

days in Washington's history. Recreation on non-navigable lakes was
also deemed important, whereas irrigation appropriations from lakes
are relatively less significant. With the growing social and economic
importance of recreational uses of small streams, it is likely that the
Washington Supreme Court would either distinguish or overrule Griffith today. As the population of the state grows, the public demand
for recreational uses of small streams will continue to increase. Sev-

eral other western states have recognized public rights of navigation
on streams that are not commercially navigable but are navigable for
pleasure craft only. 3

Washington may follow the example set by

public to use the lake, the state's failure to control public use of the lake was an unreasonable
interference with the riparian rights of private lakefront owners. Id. at 756, 420 P.2d at 356.
231. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 89 (1987).
232. See SLADE et al., supranote 40, at 162 ("The nearly universal rule is that the public trust
doctrine does not grant the public any right or privilege of perpendicular access by crossing over
private land."). Presumably, a float plane could land on a non-navigable-for-title lake without
trespassing over private property. But the number of such incidents is so small as to be virtually
irrelevant.
233. Ralph W. Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH. L.
REV. 580, 612-14 (1960).
234. See People ex rel Younger v. County of El Dorado, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Ct. App. 1979);
Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1976);
People v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1971); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). But cf.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Colo. 1979) (holding that "the public has no right to use
waters overlying private lands for recreational purposes"); State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d
1356, 1364 (Kan. 1990) (holding that absent contrary legislation, owners of beds of navigable
streams have exclusive right to control everything above the streambei). In 1987, the Oregon
Legislature enacted two statutes that apply the public trust doctrine to all waters of the state.
Act of June 10, 1987, ch. 264, 1987 Or. Laws 411 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455-.500
(1991)); Act of July 20, 1987, ch. 859, 1987 Or. Laws 1757 (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
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those other states for streams. As noted above, it has already in effect
done so for lakes.
3.

Other Issues Affecting the GeographicalScope

a. Additions and Losses of Public Trust Lands and Waters Due to
Natural and Artificial Changes
L Accretion/Reliction
The natural world, always dynamic, pays little heed to the boundaries set by humans. Coasts and shores change. The Long Beach
Peninsula, located in Pacific County in southwestern Washington
State, is a good example. Historically, large accretions have extended
the peninsula's ocean beaches hundreds of feet to the west.235 Thus,
the question of ownership of accretions in Washington State is not just
an academic one; it implicates very real, and valuable, public and private interests.
The general rule in most states is that gradual changes by accretion
or reliction change the boundaries of privately owned uplands and
public trust lands. Washington follows this rule for shorelines along
fresh water rivers and lakes.2 36
As to accretions to ocean beaches that occurred after 1889 statehood, however, the state asserts ownership. In Hughes v. State,2 37 the
Washington Supreme Court held that accretions to ocean beaches that
occurred after statehood in 1889 belonged to the State of Washington,
not the upland owner. Mrs. Hughes appealed the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that because Mrs. Hughes'
predecessor in title had received the property from the United States
prior to Washington statehood, her right to accretions to her land was
governed by federal, not state law. 238 According to the Court, under
federal common law, Mrs. Hughes was entitled to the accretions to
her property.2 39 After a brief flirtation with expanding the role of fed§§ 537.332-.360 (1991)); see also Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1150-52 (Miss. 1990)
(adopting an expansive interpretation of waters that are navigable in fact).
235. Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission, The Evolution of Accreted Lands
Ownership on the Ocean Beaches of the Long Beach Peninsula 1 (1981, updated 1982)
(unpublished report, on file with the Washington Law Review).
236. Ghione v. State, 26 Wash. 2d 635, 644, 175 P.2d 955, 961 (1946); Spinning v. Pugh, 65
Wash. 490, 118 P. 635 (1911).
237. 67 Wash. 2d 799, 816, 410 P.2d 20, 29 (1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 290 (1967); see also WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 79.94.310 (West 1991).
238. Hughes v. State, 389 U.S. 290, 291 (1967).
239. Id. The Court in Hughes did not address the question of whether the federal rule
applied to accretions to property where the title was acquired from the federal government after
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eral common law in determining the rights of federal patentees, the
Court limited the application of federal law to cases like Hughes where
ocean front property was involved on the ground that international
relations were implicated. 24
The Seashore Conservation Act24 1 provides that all accretions along
the ocean shores owned by the state are declared public highways the
same as ocean tidelands. The Washington State Parks and Recreation
Commission has established a negotiation system in an attempt to
manage these accreted lands.24 2
ii. Avulsion
Under Washington law, the addition or loss of land due to avulsion
or sudden catastrophe does not affect the seaward boundary. 243 Most
244
other states adhere to this fixed boundary rule for avulsive changes.
Thus if a navigable river changed its course suddenly by avulsion, title
to the original bed would remain in the state, and would still be subject
to the public trust doctrine. The new location of the river would also
be subject to the public trust doctrine, although the bed would be privately owned.
statehood. A description of the Hughes holding in California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v.
United States, 457 U.S. 273, 280 (1982), suggests that this federal rule on accretion ownership
applies to all federal patents along oceanfronts, not just pre-statehood patents.
240. Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 377 n.6
(1977). In a more recent decision, California ex rel State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457
U.S. 273, 279-82 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the application of federal law to
accretions along the ocean when it held that federal law dictates that accretions to federal lands
belong to the federal government.
241.

WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.51.650-.765 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
242. A commentator discussing the evolution of accredited land cims states that:
In April, 1968, negotiations between private landowners and WSPRC [Washington State
Parks and Recreation Commission] led to the establishment of a Seashore Conservation
Line (SCL), and a program to secure dedications west of this line from persons who had
clear title up to the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the boundary of the SCA [Seashore
Conservation Area] changed-where applicable-to this new coordinate line, established by
WSPRC, approximately 150 feet east of the line of vegetation on the peninsula.... The
agreement also required the SCA to be reestablished in 1980 and every ten years thereafter
to insure it remains the same distance from the line of mean high tide.
Thomas A. Terich & Sandra D. Snyder, The Evolution of Accreted Land Claims on the Long
Beach Peninsula of Washington State, 59 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Washington Law Review) (citations omitted).
243. Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 442, 205 P. 1062, 1064 (1922).
244. See, eg., Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986) ("By
way of contrast to our law regarding accretion and reliction, boundaries and titles are not
affected by avulsion."), aff'd, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
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iii. Artificial Changes
States generally treat artificial changes in the shoreline the same as
avulsive changes-i.e., boundaries remain fixed. This is particularly
true if the owner of the upland property brings about the change to
add to the property.2 45 Where the owner of property is not involved
in, or is a stranger to, the cause of the change, several courts have held
that title will vest in the upland owner.2' Such changes in the shoreline often occur where a neighboring owner or the state has erected a
seawall, pier, or breakwater. Artificially created water bodies generally are privately owned.24 7
Artificial changes along coastlines and shorelines may also raise
other issues besides title. For example, if a waterside owner fills or
alters tidelands, will they still be subject to the public trust? The California Supreme Court, in Berkeley v. Superior Court, balanced the
interests of the public and of landowners when it stated that the trust
still applies to tidelands "still physically adaptable for trust uses" but
not to lands "rendered substantially valueless for those purposes.""24
The Washington Supreme Court quoted Berkeley extensively on this
point in Orion,24 9 and thus might follow a similar rule.2 5 °
Yet another issue is whether the public trust doctrine applies to artificially created tidelands, shorelands, bottomlands or submerged lands.
Some state courts have held that the trust does not apply to such
lands,2 5 1 but another court held that it does.25 2
245. See, eg., Menominee River Lumber Co. v. Seidl, 135 N.W. 854, 856 (Wis. 1912).
246. See, eg., State Dept. of Natural Resources v. Pankratz, 538 P.2d 984, 989 (Alaska 1975).
247. See Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1990).
248. Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). In
applying this test, the court said that tidelands that have been filled, whether or not they have
been substantially improved, are free from the trust to the extent that they are no longer subject
to tidal action. The court noted that parcels that no longer have Bay frontage were obvious
examples of where the trust had been extinguished. Id. at 374; see also State v. Central Vt. Ry.,
571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989) (land filled along lakeshore still subject to the public trust).
249. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640 n.9, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 n.9 (1987), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
250. The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306,
462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970), suggests that the Washington court will
have little tolerance for those who fill public trust lands. In Vilbour, the court required that fill
be removed from Lake Chelan. Id at 316, 462 P.2d at 239.
251. See, eg., Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986), aff'd,
484 U.S. 469 (1988); O'Neill v. State Highway Dept., 235 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1967).
252. Mentor Harbor Yacht Club v. Mentor Lagoons, .nc., 163 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ohio 1959)
(holding that if waters were naturally navigable, then an artificial extension of a channel brought
the extended waters under the public trust doctrine).
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Lands Exempt from the Public Trust Doctrine

Several categories of land may be exempt from the public trust doctrine. These include: 1) lands conveyed prior to statehood; 2) federal
acquisitions of state public trust lands; and 3) lands covered by Indian
treaties.
First, tidelands and shorelands conveyed to private parties prior to
statehood may not be subject to the public trust. ]Extinguishment of
the trust requires express and unequivocal statement in the words of
the original grant.25 3 Given the federal government's responsibility to
hold lands in trust for future states, few federal grants are likely to
extinguish the public trust interest.
The history of federal grants in Washington, however, indicates that
in this state the public trust continues to apply to pre-statehood grants.
Many pre-statehood grants to private parties suggest that the land
boundary extends to the meander line. The government meander line,
when compared to the line of mean high tide, is often far out in the
water.2 54 The federal government, however, generally had no right to
convey lands below the high water mark, but held 2those
lands in trust
55
for future states under the equal footing doctrine.
Nevertheless, the Washington State Constitution affirmed federal
patents to tidelands and shorelands by providing that "this section
[declaring public ownership of tidelands and shorelands] shall not be
construed so as to debar any person from asserting his claim to vested
25 6
rights."
On its face, this phrase appears to only disclaim state ownership of
lands that the federal government validly conveyed into private hands.
Nonetheless, the Washington Supreme Court early in its history held
that this constitutional provision was a present grant of the state's
interest in previously patented lands.2 57 As the court wrote in Scurry
v. Jones:
253. City of East Haven v. Hemingway, 7 Conn. 186, 199 (1828) (a pre-statehood grant could
convey public rights into private hands, but only with "words so unequivocal, as to leave no
reasonable doubt concerning the meaning").
254. Phillip W. Lear, Accretion, Erosion and Avulsiorn A Survey of RiparianandLittoral Title
Problems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 265, 274 (1991); see, eg., Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 374 (1891) (finding gross surveyor error because a large spit emanating
from the shore of a lake and virtually dividing it in two was not meandered).
255. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
256. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
257. See, eg., Cogswell v. Forrest, 14 Wash. 1, 43 P. 1098 (1896); Scurry v. Jones, 4 Wash.
468, 30 P. 726 (1892). Subsequent cases following Scurry include Smith Tug & Barge Co. v.
Columbia-Pacific Towing Corp., 78 Wash. 2d 975, 978-79, 482 P.2d 769, 722, cert. denied, 404
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And as the state, in the section immediately preceding this, had
asserted its title to all such lands, whether occupied or unoccupied,
which had not been thus patented, it seems clear to us that the evident
intent of the disclaimer was to ratify the action of the United States in
the issuance of such patents. In our opinion, the interest of the state
passed as fully to the grantees in such patents, or to those holding under
them, as it would have done had there been express words of grant used
in the constitution. Any other interpretation of the language used
would deprive it of any beneficial force whatever.25 8
Thus it was the state, not the federal government, that actually gave
these lands to private parties. The state is bound by the public trust
doctrine, and any conveyances of tidelands that the disclaimer clause
did make to private parties would not have destroyed the public trust
2 59
interest in those lands.
Congress may also convey public trust lands prior to statehood in
accordance with international obligations. In Shively v. Bowlby the
Supreme Court stated that "Congress has the power to make grants of
lands below high-water mark of navigable waters in any Territory of
the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to
' '2 °
perform international obligations.
U.S. 829 (1971); Bleakley v. Lake Washington Mill Co., 65 Wash. 215, 221-23, 118 P. 5, 8
(1911).
258. Scurry, 4 Wash. at 470, 30 P. at 727.
259. Recently, there was a dispute over the waterward boundary between uplands owned by a
private landowner and tidelands owned by the State of Washington. See State's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Request for a
Preliminary Injunction, State v. Lund (Super. Ct. Pierce County, filed Aug. 4, 1989) (No.
249864) (on file with the Washington Law Review). Although the case ultimately settled, the
state's memorandum raises several interesting issues, such as whether post-statehood patentees
also had a waterward boundary of the meander line, and whether such a boundary is a moving
boundary so that as erosion occurred along the Lunds' property, their property line moved
landward. Id. at 5-17.
260. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,48 (1894). The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Summa
Corp. v. California ex reL State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984), comes closest to an
example of an extinguishment of the public trust doctrine in accordance with the federal
government's international obligations. The Summa case involved the question of whether a
lagoon near Los Angeles was subject to the public trust doctrine. Summa Corporation's title
dated back to an 1839 Mexican title. Pursuant to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
Congress set up a Board of Land Commissioners in 1851 to decide the rights of those claiming
title to lands under the Spanish or Mexican governments. Id. at 203. Summa Corporation's
predecessors in title finally had their rights in the land at issue confirmed in 1873. While the
Court acknowledged that ordinary federal patents purporting to convey tidelands located within
a state are invalid because the federal government holds such tidelands in trust for states, the
situation was different with patents confirmed under the 1851 Act because the United States was
discharging its international obligations. The Court held that California's failure to assert its
public trust interest during the confirmation process precluded it from claiming that a public
trust easement applied at the present time.
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Second, when the federal government exercises its power of eminent
domain to acquire trust burdened lands, those lands may become
The few case precedents on this issue, howexempt from the trust.
26 1
ever, are conflicting.
Third, lands may be exempt from the public trust doctrine because
of an Indian treaty or agreement 2 62 entered into prior to statehood.
Presumably the trust would not apply to Indian country because state
law does not apply to Indian reservations unless Congress clearly mandates otherwise.26 3
Whether a treaty gives a tribe title to the beds underlying navigable
waters involves conflicting presumptions. On the cne hand, a fundamental principle in interpreting Indian treaties is that they are to be
interpreted as the Indians would have understood them. 2" Most Indians presumably believed they were receiving the water bodies and beds
within or alongside their reservations. On the other hand, under the
equal footing doctrine, the federal government held the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for each future state until they entered
the Union. These two legal principles collided direztly in Montana v.
United States.2 65 The Court found that the Crow treaty language did
not overcome the presumption that the beds of navigable waters
remain in trust for future states and pass to the new states when they
assume sovereignty. The Court also noted that the Crow Tribe had
historically depended on buffalo and other upland g ame rather than on
fishing. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the state, not the tribe,
held title to the bed of the Big Horn River. WhetLer an Indian tribe
or the state holds title to the bed of navigable waters, therefore, is
likely to turn on both the language of the treaty or agreement and on
whether the tribe has historically depended on resources located in the
261. See, eg., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981)
(noting that the federal government is as restricted as states are in its ability to abdicate its
sovereign jus publicum to private individuals). But cf United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land,
685 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that where the federal government exercises its
powers of eminent domain, the state public trust doctrine is extinguished). For a discussion of
the existence of a federal public trust doctrine, see also supra part III.A.
262. No treaties were signed with Indian tribes after 1871. However, reservations were
created thereafter, usually by agreement between the tribe and the Executive, and approved by
Congress. Additional reservations were created by Executive Order and by congressional
legislation.

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 127-28 (Rennard

Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.).
263. For a general discussion of federal preemption of state law, see id. at 270-79.
264. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
265. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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water or on submerged land.26 6 As noted previously, if the tribe has
title, the public trust interest under state law is probably extinguished
because state law does not generally apply on an Indian reservation
unless Congress clearly expresses such an intent.26 7
C. InterestsProtected by the Public Trust Doctrine
1. Interests Protected Under Washington Law
The classic list of interests protected by the public trust includes
commerce, navigation, and fisheries.2 68 The Washington Supreme
Court has followed the general trend by expanding the range of public
interests. The court noted in Orion that it had extended "the doctrine
beyond navigational and commercial fishing rights to include 'incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other

related recreational purposes.'

"269

Under Washington law, environmental quality and water quality
are probably also protected interests. The public's interest in fishing
can only be realized if water quality and quantity are adequate to support fish.27 ° Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court indicated in
Orion that it would look favorably on a claim that protecting the environment is a public trust interest. The Orion court found trust principles embodied in the Shoreline Management Act's underlying policy,
"which contemplates 'protecting against adverse effects to the public
health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the
state and their aquatic life.' "271 The court also cited Marks v.
Whitney, a California case recognizing the public interest in both eco266. For a recent case where the court found that a tribe had title to the water beneath a
navigable waterway, see Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). See also Andrea G. Oakley, Note, Not on Clams Alone:
DeterminingIndian Title to Intertidal Lands-United States v. Aam, 65 WAsH. L. REv. 713
(1990).
267. COHEN, supra note 262, at 270-79.
268. Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENvrL. L. 485,
495 (1989). Even early cases like Arnold v. Mundy, 10 Am. Dec. 356, 368 (N.J. 1821),
recognized a broad spectrum of public interests that included "fishing, fowling, sustenance, and
all other uses of the water and its products."
269. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (quoting
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316, 462 P.2d 232, 239 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878
(1970)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
270. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201 (Ct. App.
1986) (holding that Water Board had authority to supervise appropriators under the public trust
doctrine to protect fish and wildlife); Johnson, supra note 268, at 488.
271. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641 n.l1, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.Il (quoting Portage Bay-Roanoke
Park Community Council v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 92 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 593 P.2d 151, 153
(1979)).
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logical values and preserving tidelands in their natural state.27 2 Therefore, given the proper case, the Washington Supreme Court may
follow several other states that recognize water quality and environmental preservation as public trust interests.27 3
If water quality is a protected interest, the public trust doctrine
might limit activities that degrade water quality, including discharges
of wastes into public waters, activities that cause erosion and thus silting of waterbodies, and prior appropriations that reduce the assimilative capacity of waterbodies and thus result in degradation of water
quality.2 74 Of course, any application of the public trust doctrine in
these areas would have to take account of existing federal and state
laws on water pollution, the prior appropriation code, and the legitimate economic expectations of those affected.
Using the public trust doctrine to protect environmental quality is a
logical extension of the doctrine in Washington. Early courts did not
often expressly address environmental quality as a protected public

trust right. It was widely thought that nature's bounty was limitless.
Pollution, however, can limit or destroy public enjoyment of trust
resources just as much as filling or committing tidelands and shorelands to exclusively private uses. In the past, the public trust doctrine
did not allow such monopolization; now that the threat to public
rights is in the form of pollution and environmental degradation, the
courts are expanding their interpretation of the pubiic trust doctrine to
275
protect the public rights from that threat.
272. Id. at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10.
273. Several courts have recognized environmental quality as a public trust interest. See, eg.,
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.), cart. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983) (extending the doctrine to cover
"navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water
quality"); Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis. 1972) (finding a public right to preserve
wetlands because they "serve a vital role in nature"). In 1987 the Oregon Legislature enacted
two statutes indicating that the public trust doctrine covers water quality. Act of June 10, 1987,
ch. 264, 1987 Or. Laws 411 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455-.500 (1991)); Act of July 20,
1987, ch. 859, 1987 Or. Laws 1757 (codified at OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.332-.360 (1991)); see also
Johnson, supra note 268, at 496-98. But cf MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 340 N.E.2d 487,
490-91 (Mass. 1976) (holding that preservation of ocean food chain and tidelands in natural state
was not as practical or productive as dredging and filling wetlands).
274. Johnson, supra note 268, at 505.
275. Now some legal scholars and environmentalists are claiming that the public trust
doctrine should prohibit development that interferes with the delicate process of replenishing
sand on our nation's beaches. Cory Dean, A New Theory: A Beach Has a Right to Its Sand, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 29, 1991, at B9.
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2. Interests Potentially Protected in Washington
a. Right of Public to Walk on and/orHarvest Shellfish on Privately
Owned Tidelands
The Washington Supreme Court has yet to consider whether the
public has a right to walk across privately owned tidelands, or whether
the public may dig clams on those tidelands. One commentator notes
that nearly all states recognize that the public trust doctrine provides
the public a right to pass and repass over public trust tidelands." 6
Although other states' courts have issued opinions which generally
lend support to the public's right of access, few have directly
addressed whether the public has a right to walk across privately
owned tidelands.
For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Jackvony v.
Powel,277 looked to Rhode Island's constitution that guarantees to the
people "the privileges of the shore," and concluded that one of those
privileges included the right to pass along the shore.2 7 The case did
not, however, involve the public's rights to pass along a privately held
beach. Rather, it involved an attempt by a beach commission to fence
off a beach owned by the city of Newport.27 9 Similarly, in Tucci v.
Salzhauer,2 8 ° a New York court held that the public had a right to
pass and repass over lands owned by the Town of Hempstead. Thus,
Tucci, like Jackvony, recognized a public right of passage, but did not
specifically address the question of whether the public would have a
right to pass over privately held tidelands.
New Jersey Supreme Court decisions suggest that the public would
have a right to walk over privately held tidelands. The public's right
to use tidal lands and water "encompasses navigation, fishing and recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities."2 8 ' Presumably, "other shore activities" would include the right
to walk along tidelands. Also significant is the fact that New Jersey
has recognized the public's right to use the dry sand area of privately
276. SLADE et al., supra note 40, at 162.
277. 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941).
278. Id. at 556, 558; see also Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to
Rhode Island's Shore, 24 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 313, 325-26 (1990) (discussing a recent
amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution that listed a right to pass along the shore as a
public right).
279. Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 558.
280. 336 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972). The court noted that the public's right of
passage even included the right to push a baby carriage along the shore. Id. at 724.
281. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 821 (1984).
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owned beaches under the public trust doctrine.2 82 Because the New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized the public's right to use privately
owned dry sand areas of beaches, it probably would recognize the public's right to walk over privately held tidelands.
California would also probably recognize the public's right to walk
along privately held tidelands. In Marks v. Whitney, 283 the California
Supreme Court noted that the public trust easement on privately held
lands includes the public's "right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, [and] to
use for boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters
of the state .... The public uses to which tidelands are subject are
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs."2 84 This language suggests that California would recognize a public right to walk
over privately held tidelands.
In Massachusetts and Maine, however, the put-lie's rights do not
include the right to pass over privately held tidelands. In Opinion of
the Justices, the Massachusetts Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a proposed statute that would have given the public a
right of passage over privately held tidelands.2 85 HIn determining the
scope of public rights remaining in privately held tidelands, the court
considered the colonial ordinance of 1641-47. In that ordinance the
Massachusetts colony extended the titles of upland owners to encompass land as far as the mean low water line or 100 rods from the mean
high water line, whichever was less. The court found that the original
ordinance had only reserved the public's rights in fishing, fowling, and
navigation, and it refused to take a more expansive view of public
rights which would include the right to pass along, or enjoy recreation
on, privately held tidelands.2 86 Therefore, it found the proposed ordinance to be an unconstitutional taking of private property without
compensation.2 87
The Supreme Court of Maine recently followed Massachusetts'
course in a close four-to-three opinion, Bell v. Town of Wells.288
Maine, which was originally a district of Massachusetts, shares a common legal history with that state. The majority in Bell found that
Maine's constitution had confirmed the seventeenth century Massa282. Id.
283. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
284. Id. at 380.
285. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566-67 (Mass. 1974).
286. Id. at 567.
287. For a discussion of the relation between takings and the public trust doctrine, see infra
part IV.
288. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
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chusetts statute giving upland owners title to tidelands. The court
traced the description of public rights in cases from both Massachusetts and Maine. Its conclusion mirrored that of the Massachusetts
court: the public's rights are limited to those of navigation, fishing,
and fowling.28 9 The court specifically mentioned "recreational walking" as a right that it refused to recognize.2 90
The results of the Massachusetts and Maine decisions are somewhat
anomalous. As one commentator noted, Massachusetts' approach
does not in fact preclude the public from walking on the foreshore.
Instead, it simply requires that a person desiring to stroll along the
shore carry a fishing line or net.2 91
Washington has no ordinances similar to Massachusetts' 1641-47
ordinance that gave upland owners title to tidelands. The Washington
court has also recently recognized a broad range of recreational rights
under the public trust doctrine.29 2 These facts suggest that the Washington Supreme Court might support the public's right to walk over
privately held tidelands, but the eventual outcome on this issue
remains uncertain.
Similarly, the public's right to gather shellfish on privately held
lands also remains uncertain in Washington. An early Washington
case, Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge,293 favored private rights to
shellfish over public rights. The plaintiff canning company leased tidelands from the state, using them to raise local and eastern clams.
Defendant was a competing cannery that sent its employees, who happened to be Indians, to collect shellfish on plaintiff's tidelands. The
court held that plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting the
defendant and its employees from trespassing and digging clams. The
court reasoned that because clams live in the soil under the waters,
they belong to private owners or lessees of the tidelands.2 9 4
289. Id. at 175-76.
290. Id. at 175.
291. Jeffrey D. Curtis, Comment, Coastal Recreation: Legal Methods for Securing Public
Rights in the Seashore, 33 ME. L. REv. 69, 83 (1981).
292. The public's rights include "'incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water
skiing, and other related recreational purposes ....... Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621,
641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (quoting Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316, 462 P.2d
232, 239 (1969), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970)), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). Moreover,
on ocean beaches, a Washington State Attorney General's Opinion has recognized the public's
customary rights, and those rights would presumably include the public's right to walk along
tidelands. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 27, supra note 215. The public might also resort to other legal
theories, such as dedication and prescription.
293. 49 Wash. 127, 94 P. 922 (1908).
294. Id. at 131, 94 P. at 923. Similarly, in Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179
(1909), the Washington Supreme Court held that when the state deeded oyster lands to a private
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Sequim Bay Canning, however, is not solid authority against a pub-

lic trust right to harvest all shellfish. First, the plaintiff in Sequim Bay
Canning leased lands specifically to raise clams. 295 Without a secure
right to raise clams on those lands, the company's lease would have
been worthless.2 96 Where a party owns or leases tidelands for a purpose other than raising shellfish, it is unclear that the court would find
such a compelling private property interest in shellfish located on that
land. Indeed, Sequim Bay Canningdeparted significantly from earlier
common law precedents on the ownership of shellfish.2 97 Second,
Sequim Bay Canning did not involve the general public's right to
gather naturally growing shellfish. It involved hostile efforts by one
cannery to destroy another. Therefore, Sequim Bay Canning may not
control whether the public has a right to gather shellfish on all privately owned tidelands. Significantly, even states like Maine and Massachusetts, that have been very conservative about expanding public
rights to privately owned tidelands, have recognized the public's right
to gather shellfish on privately held tidelands.2 98

party, that party received a right to exclusive possession of those tidelands. A later decision,
State v. Van Vlack, 101 Wash. 503, 505-06, 172 P. 563, 564 (1918), idso described shellfish as
private property. The appellant in Van Vack claimed that the state could not prohibit private
owners of tidelands from harvesting shellfish between April 1 and September I (which is when
shellfish reproduce) because the shellfish were their property. The court acknowledged the
public's interest in shellfish by upholding the state's efforts to limit the harvesting of shellfish as a
valid exercise of the state's police power.
295. The Department of Natural Resources still issues leases to private parties for raising
oysters, geoducks, shellfish, and for other agricultural uses. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.96
(West 1991).
296. Sequim Bay Canning Co., 49 Wash. at 129, 94 P. at 922.
297. The U.S. Supreme Court early recognized that public rights to shellfish were legally
indistinct from those in floating fish, even on privately owned tidelanc.s, in Martin v. Lessee of
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413, 414 (1842). The public's common law right was limited,
however, to those shellfish that grew naturally. Shellfish that were planted were treated
differently. Arnold v. Mundy, 10 Am. Dec. 356 (N.J. 1821); Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42
(N.Y. 1835); Decker v. Fisher, 4 Barb. 492 (N.Y. 1848); Lowndes v. Dickerson, 34 Barb 586
(N.Y. 1861); Brinckerhoffv. Starkins, 11 Barb 248 (N.Y. 1851). Inexplicably and without citing
any authority the court in Sequim Bay Canning ignored these precedents and concluded that
ownership of land automatically included ownership of clams found upon or within the land.
298. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989) (broadly construing the
public's right to fish to include "digging for worms, clams, and shellfish"); Town of Welifleet v.
Glaze, 525 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (Mass. 1988) ("While the public clearly has the right to take
shellfish on tidal flats, there is no general right in the public to pass over the land, or to use it for
bathing purposes."). Other states, such as North Carolina and Florida, have decisions that
strongly support the public's right to shellfish. State ex reL Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825,
831-32 (N.C. 1988); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 47 So. 353, 356 (Fla. 1908).
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b.

Rights of Ripariansand the Public to Boat and Fish on the

Surfaces of Non-Navigable-for-Title Waters
This subject was previously discussed as an extension of the geographical scope of the public trust doctrine.29 9 Alternatively, one may
view it as a public interest.

c. Aesthetic Beauty
Preservation of aesthetic beauty is a logical addition to the list of
protected public trust interests. Indeed, for the sightseer, the enjoyment of natural beauty is a form of recreation. The Washington court
has already recognized recreation as a protected interest. 300 Several
other states have recognized aesthetic beauty as a legitimate public
trust interest. 3 1 The Washington Shoreline Management Act also
mentions the value of aesthetic beauty.30 2
d.

The Futurefor Recognizing New Interests Protected by the
Doctrine

As a dynamic common law principle, courts will likely continue to
shape the public trust doctrine to fit the ever-evolving public interest.30 3 The Washington Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it
has not defined the total scope of the doctrine,a° implying that it
might extend the doctrine further to meet future public needs, especialy if those needs were not taken into account when private rights
were acquired.
299. See supra part III.B.2.e.
300. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (citing In re
Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
301. See, eg., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.) (holding that
protection of the scenic views of Mono Lake and its shore are covered by the public trust), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983) (including the
protection of "aesthetic beauty" under the public trust doctrine); State v. Trudeau 408 N.W.2d
337, 343 (Wis. 1987) (rights of citizens in bodies of water held in trust by the state include the
enjoyment of natural scenic beauty), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988).
302. WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991) (in implementing the policies
of the Shoreline Management Act, "the public's opportunity to enjoy the physical and aesthetic
qualities of natural shorelines" shall be preserved).
303. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 640-41, 747 P.2d at 1073 ("Recognizing modem science's ability
to identify the public need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond its navigational
aspects."); Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 ("The public uses to which tidelands are subject are
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs."). But cf Lazarus,supra note 19, at 656
(describing the public trust doctrine as a convenient legal fiction used by courts "to avoid
judicially perceived limitations or consequences of existing rules of law").
304. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
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As the list of protected public trust interests grows, new questions
arise. Confficts will arise between two or more public trust interests. 30 5 For example, what should happen when the interests of commerce or recreation conflict with the interest in preserving the
environmental integrity of trust resources? It is unlikely that courts
will or even should set up a rigid hierarchy of public trust uses. A
better answer is balancing competing uses. As an example, the Shoreline Management Act balances competing uses. The Act gives priority
to values and uses such as water-dependent uses furthering public
access and enjoyment of the states' waters, and preservation. 3°
D. Public Trust Restrictions on State Power
When Washington became a state, it asserted ovmership over tidelands and shorelands. Seeking to foster economic development, however, the state conveyed a large amount of its tidelands and
shorelands. Early Washington cases recognized an almost unfettered
power of the legislature to dispose of those lands.3 7
More recently, in Caminiti, the Washington Supreme Court dealt
with the application of the public trust doctrine to public lands.30 8
Preliminarily, the court discussed the origin and background of the
doctrine, as well as its application to private property, saying that
while the state could convey private interests in tidelands and shorelands, it could never "sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty"
over them. 30 9 According to the court, "[t]he state can no more convey
or give away this jus publicum interest than it can 'abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of
the peace.' "10 In adopting this position the court adopted a role as
reviewer of state conveyances to assure that they Eire consistent with
public trust obligations.3 1 '
305. See, e.g., Carstens v. California Coastal Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1986).
306. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991).
307. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 244-45, 26 P. 539, 541 (1891) (stating that tidelands
"belong to the state in actual proprietary, and that the state has full power to dispose of the same,
subject to no restrictions, save those imposed upon the legislature by the constitution of the state
and the constitution of the United States").
308. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988).
309. Id. at 666, 732 P.2d at 992.
310. Id. at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892)).
311. For the crucial role of the judiciary in enforcing the public trust, see generally Sax, supra
note 20.
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In Caminiti, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a test for
determining when state legislation modifies the public trust doctrine as
applied to state lands. The court relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme
Court's seminal opinion in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.1 2
First, the court must inquire whether the state, by reason of the legislation, has given up its right to control the jus publicum.3 13 If the
court finds that it has, then the court must determine "whether by
doing so the State has (a) promoted the interests of the public in the
jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired" the jus
3 14
publicum.
Applying the new test, the court nonetheless held that the statute at
issue in Caminiti did not violate the public trust doctrine. a15 The
plaintiffs had challenged the validity of a statute that granted private
landowners the right to extend recreational docks onto abutting public
shorelands and tidelands without paying money to the state.3 16 Initially, the court discussed the interrelationship of the public trust doctrine and the Shoreline Management Act. The court concluded that
the Act contains legislative controls that meet the requirements of the
public trust. The Shoreline Act lists among its preferred uses single
family residences and piers. The court then concluded that the statute
at issue in Caminiti was consistent with the Shoreline Act, and, by
implication, with the public trust doctrine.3 17
The Caminiticourt also found that the state did not give up its right
of control over the jus publicum by allowing private landowners to
build docks on public shorelands and tidelands. The court supported
its position with several arguments: 1) the statute does not allow for
private docks in harbor areas; 2) private docks are to be used only for
recreational purposes; 3) the Department of Natural Resources has
the authority to revoke a property owner's right to maintain such a
dock; and 4) these residential private docks are "subject to local regulation governing construction, size and length. ' 31 8 These factors led
the court to conclude that the government's control over the docks
was adequate to satisfy the requirements of the public trust doctrine.
312. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
313. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994.
314. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994-95 (emphasis added).
315. For a critique of the Caminiti case, see A. Reid Allison III, The Public Trust Doctrinein
Washington, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rv. 633, 671-73 (1987).
316. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.105 (West 1991).
317. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 995.
318. Id. at 672, 732 P.2d at 995-96.
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The court continued its analysis and found that the construction of
private docks on public tidelands and shorelands actually promoted,
to some extent, the public's interest in the jus publicum as defined in
the Shoreline Act.3 19 Finally, the court concluded that such docks do
not impair the public interest.3 20
Although the Caminiticourt set forth a test indicating that it would
seriously scrutinize legislative actions affecting trust property, in
actual practice it barely scrutinized the legislation at issue. As a
result, the outcome of future cases is unclear. Will the court give real
substance to the test it enunciated, or will it continue to defer to the
legislature? A recent case, DraperMachine Works, Inc. v. Department
of Natural Resources, suggests that deference to the legislature will
continue.3 2 1
1.

State Projects

The Shoreline Management Act applies to all shorelines owned and
administered by the state and local governments.3 22 Therefore, under
Caminiti, state projects that fall within the Shoreline Act list of preferred uses would likely be consistent with the public trust doctrine.32 3
2. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine in State and Local Land
Use Planning
Washington State policy strongly encourages comprehensive planning.32 4 In general, comprehensive planning helps to coordinate
administrative decisions involving the physical deveLopment and use of
land, air, and water resources. Public trust values should be considered when planners balance alternatives and develop recommendations. Significantly, the Washington Supreme Court's Orion decision
involved the legitimacy of two comprehensive plans, and the court
319. Id. at 673-74, 732 P.2d at 996.
320. Id
321. Draper Machine Works, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 117 Wash. 2d 306,
318-19, 815 P.2d 770, 777 (1991). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
322. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.280 (West Supp. 1991).
323. Of course, the state project would also have to pass under other state environmental
regulations, such as the State Environmental Policy Act. Id. § 43.21C (West 1983 & Supp.
1991).
324. With the passage of the Growth Management Act in 1990, the emphasis on
comprehensive planning in Washington is stronger than ever before. For example, the 1990
Growth Management Act requires counties experiencing growth, especially those that are more
populous (this includes all twelve Puget Sound counties and the cities therein), to adopt
comprehensive plans by July 1, 1993. Id. § 36.70A.040 (West 1991). Zoning consistent with
those plans must be adopted within a year thereafter. Id § 36.70A.120.
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implicitly approved comprehensive planning as a method of protecting
325
public trust resources and uses.
Authority for regional planning is delegated principally to counties,
but extends to all levels of government through the Planning Enabling
Act.3 2 6 The Act describes planning as an essential process to insure
multiple uses of environmental resources.3 27 On both the state and
local levels, comprehensive plans serve a wide variety of functions,
including state agency operating plans, port and harbor improvement
districts, aquatic lands leasing, and utility operations. Each comprehensive plan must promote the public interest, where appropriate, and
include both mandatory and optional elements.32 The planning process delineates resources and uses traditionally found under the public
trust doctrine, designing standards that allow them to coexist with
surrounding uses. Despite their acknowledged importance, compre329
hensive plans do not directly regulate property rights or land uses.
Traditionally, a comprehensive plan has been a kind of blueprint that
influences regulatory regimes such as local zoning codes and environmental designations. They have also guided political decision-making.
The 1990 Growth Management Act, however, further enhances the
importance of comprehensive plans in those counties and cities covered by the Act by requiring that development regulations be consistent with these counties' and cities' plans.330
325. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1022 (1988). The two comprehensive plans in Orion were the Skagit County Shoreline Master
Program and the Padilla Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve Management Plan.
326. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.70 (West 1991); see also id. § 35A.63 (providing for
planning and zoning in code cities). The scope and scale of planning varies, depending on the
resource, purpose, jurisdictional authority, and need for coordination. Planning efforts may be
state-wide and quite complex. However, the fundamentals of the planning process-assessing
needs, determining relative costs and benefits, and presenting alternatives-remain basically the
same. Accordingly, comprehensive planning is done at both the state and local levels. The state
generally assumes responsibility for ensuring coordination, technical assistance, policy
compliance, and consistency.
327. According to the Act, the purpose of planning is "assuring the highest standards of
environment for living, and the operation of commerce, industry, agriculture and recreation, and
assuring maximum economies and conserving the highest degree of public health, safety, morals
and welfare." Id. § 36.70.010. The language of the Act clearly aligns planning with the
regulatory police powers of government.
328. See id. § 36.70.470 regarding promotion of the public interest. Under § 36.70.330, the
required elements include land use, circulation, and supporting materials such as maps,
diagrams, and charts. Optional elements include conservation, recreation, rights of way, ports,
harbors, and public use. Id § 36.70.350. An analysis of these elements would entail
consideration of public trust lands, waters, and uses if they are present in the geographical area
under review.
329. Id. § 35A.63.080 (West 1990).
330. Id. § 36.70A.120 (West 1991). The Growth Management Act requires counties that
adopt plans under the Act to designate wetlands, steep slopes, and flood plains, and to adopt
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Some forms of comprehensive planning bear directly on preserving
elements of the public trust. The Shoreline Management Act requirement of a combination of state and local planning is an example. The

Shoreline Act clearly states the need for comprehensive planning to
allow multiple uses of the state's shorelines while protecting the public
interest.3 3 1 Such planning is essential to the creation of local shoreline
master programs (SMPs)33 2 that implement the plans. In general,
SMPs regulate use in, on, and over shorelines. Zoning classifications
create natural, conservation, rural, and urban areas specifying appropriate, conditional, and prohibited uses for each environment. SMPs
may also incorporate any other element deemed appropriate or necessary to effectuate the policy of the Shoreline Act.3 33 This clause is an
open invitation for local SMPs to expressly incorporate public trust
doctrine principles. Finally, SMPs, unlike other comprehensive plans,
are adopted into the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) and
become part of the state's Shoreline Master Program. As a result, all
local SMP rules, regulations, designations and guidelines become state
law and are enforceable.33 4 In this manner, protection of public trust
resources and uses becomes binding.
Comprehensive planning also facilitates environmental review. The
State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) established a statewide review process for evaluation and decision-making on land use
proposals.3 3 5 The intent of SEPA is to ascertain the proper balance
between development and environmental protection. Therefore,
SEPA review is made effective only through comprehensive planning.
As part of its review criteria, SEPA establishes a "trustee" responsibilcritical area protection regulations. Id. § 36.70A.170. Counties and cities that are not required
or do not choose to regulate under the provisions of the Growth Management Act must also
develop regulations to protect critical areas by March 1, 1992. Id. § 36.70A.060, as amended by
Act of July 16, 1991, ch. 32, § 21, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903. This may provide
additional opportunities to consider public trust values.
331. Id. § 90.58 (West Supp. 1991); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-14 to -28 (1990). Language
from § 90.58.020 specifically states, "coordinated planning is necessary in order to protect the
public interest associated with the shorelines of the state while, at the same time, recognizing and
protecting private property rights consistent with the public interest." WASH. REV. CODE ANN
§ 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991). Broadly stated, the public interest s to be held superior to
private rights when planning.
332. WASH. ADMIN. CODE title 173 (1990). SMPs are defined as comprehensive plans in
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.03(3)(a) (West Supp. 1991). These plans are developed locally
and must be consistent with the policies of § 90.58 before approval by the Department of
Ecology. For the most part, the state functions in an advisory capacity but has the authority to
revise, amend, or reject SMPs until they comply.
333. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.100(2)(h) (West Supp. 1991).
334. Id. § 98.58.100(1).
335. Id. § 43.21C (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); WASH. ADMIN. CODE title 197 (1990).
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ity,33 6 seeks the widest range of beneficial uses, and tries to preserve

important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage. 37 This invites consideration of the public trust doctrine. In
practice, however, SEPA reviews are handled in a generic fashion,
rarely (if ever) explicitly referring to the public trust doctrine. It is
important to note, however, that opportunities to apply public trust
principles exist because many proposals that fall under SEPA review
also may be subject to more stringent reviews such as that for shoreline substantial development permits.
From a land management perspective, area management programs
should reflect both public trust principles and comprehensive planning. 338 Balancing appropriate uses to provide the greatest public benefit or interest is a commonly stated goal of both management and the
public trust. Area management programs diverge primarily in matters
of detail. When viewed cumulatively, however, they embody most of
the principles found under the public trust doctrine.33 9
In summary, comprehensive planning implemented on both state
and local levels allows consideration of public trust principles,
resources, and uses. Zoning in the local SMPs implements these principles. Other planning projects contain the elements necessary for
similar public trust protection.
3. Licensees and Lessees of the State
By licensing and leasing public trust resources, states can control
use of the resources and receive revenue. This part discusses state
management of state-owned land, the central issue in Caminiti.34 The
issue, in a nutshell, is: what duties are imposed on the state by the
336. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.020(2)(a) (West 1983).
337. Id. § 43.21C.020(2)(d).
338. There are numerous examples of area management programs that protect and preserve
public trust rights and lands including: DNR multiple use management (Id. § 79.68.90 (West
1991)); natural area preserves (§ 79.70); natural resource conservation area (§ 79.71); scenic
rivers system (§ 79.72); aquatic lands leasing (§ 79.90; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332-30 (1990));
shellfish harvesting areas (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 75.08.080 (West Supp. 1991)); habitat
preserves (§ 77.12.650); integrated transportation systems (§ 47.01.071 (West 1986)); seashore
conservation area (§ 43.51.660 (West 1983)); and state park system (§ 43.51 (West 1983 & Supp.
1991); WASH. ADMIN. CODE Title 352 (1990)).
339. One observer has even argued that the Department of Natural Resources' Aquatic Land
Enhancement Account (ALEA) is a direct application of the public trust doctrine in
management. Susan Snow, The Aquatic Land Enhancement Account: Operationalizing the
Public Trust in Washington Submerged Land Management (1989) (unpublished M.M.A. thesis,
University of Washington (Seattle)).
340. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988).
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public trust doctrine in the management of state-owned lands that are
covered by the Seashore Conservation Act and Aquatic Lands Act?
The first inquiry is whether the legislature has relinquished control
of the trust resource. Caminitisuggests that if the state imposes conditions in its licenses, and the rights of the licensee are subject to revocation, then a court may find that the state has not relinquished control
of the resource. 341 As a practical matter, however, if a state tries to
maintain too much control over shorelands and tidelands, it may discourage all development. For example, if a state agency attempted to
lease tidelands subject to too many conditions, for a short term with
no right of renewal, private investors would not likely undertake
development. Prospects for a return on investment would be too
uncertain, and financing would be difficult. In Washington, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) leases generally may not exceed
fifty-five years for tidelands and shorelands,34 2 thirty years for the beds
of navigable waters,34 3 and ten years for leases for mariculture. 34
DNR has other means to maintain state control, such as refusing lease
renewals and cancelling leases for non-compliance.
State relinquishment of control over a trust resource will be upheld
only if it promotes, or does not substantially impair, that interest. The
Washington Supreme Court decision in Caminitiindicates that it may
look to the Shoreline Management Act for guidance on whether a
given use promotes the public interest. 345 Even though the Shoreline
Act has dubious preferences such as the one for single family residences, it nonetheless provides some protection for the public interest.
For example, one of the stated preferences in the Shoreline Act is for
water uses that are "unique to or dependent upon use of the state's
shoreline.

346

In defining the scope of the public interest, the court may also look
to the list of public trust interests in Orion and interests recognized by
other courts. 34 7 "Promoting the public interest" also raises issues.
For example, would it be inconsistent with the public trust doctrine to
allow leasing or licensing of uses which, although neither within the
Shoreline Act's list of preferred uses nor within the judicially recog341. Id. at 671-73, 732 P.2d at 995-96.
342. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.94.150(3) (West 1991).
343. Id. § 79.95.020.
344. Id. § 79.96.010.
345. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670-71, 732 P.2d at 994-95.
346. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020 (West Supp. 1991).
347. For a discussion of the public trust interests that the court has recognized or might
recognize in Washington, see supra parts III.C. 1-2.

580

Public Trust Doctrine
nized list of public interests, are accessory or incidental to permitted
uses? Could the state lease or license land for a use that would not
further the public trust if the developer agreed to take measures, such
as public accessways, that promote the public interest? 34
4. State Obligation to Abide by Public Trust Principleson StateOwned Land
Caminiti is the only major Washington case in which state action
has been challenged as inconsistent with the public trust doctrine. As
a result, state law is not well developed. The Washington Supreme
Court could, however, derive valuable principles and lessons from
other states' case law.
For example, the California Supreme Court's decision in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court349 (the Mono Lake case) indicated
that the state had an ongoing duty to uphold public trust values. The
court found that the Water Board had not taken public trust interests
into account when it approved Los Angeles' appropriation permit that
diverted waters from Mono Basin. The court remanded the case to
the Water Board to reconsider allocation of water in light of public
trust values. Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court could require
the state to re-evaluate permits, licenses, and leases made in the past in
light of evolving public trust doctrine principles.
Although some courts have allowed legislatures to convey trust
lands for purposes that have nothing to do with public trust uses,
Washington is unlikely to follow suit. Those courts require only an
advancement of the general public interest, as opposed to a public
trust interest, in exchange for the conveyance. For example, courts
have validated conveyances of land for offshore oil production, 350 marketability of title for structures, 35 ' construction of a YMCA,35 2 a restaurant, a bar and a shopping complex,3 53 because the uses were in the
public interest.
It is unlikely that the Washington Supreme Court would take such
an approach if it continues to look to the Shoreline Management Act
348. See DONALD L. CONNORS & JACK H. ARCHER, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: ITS
ROLE IN MANAGING AMERICA'S CoAsTs 48 n. 100 (Aug. 2, 1990 Draft) (suggesting that a state
agency might be able to lease or license land under both of these circumstances); see also infra
notes 350-55 and accompanying text.
349. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). But cf text accompanying notes
350-53.
350. Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797, 815-16 (Cal. 1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 517 (1929).
351. Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Mass. 1981).
352. People v. City of Long Beach, 338 P.2d 177, 178-79 (Cal. 1959).
353. Martin v. Smith, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725, 728 (Ct. App. 1960).
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for policy guidance. Because the Shoreline Act has a general preference for water-related uses, the court may limit the scope of the public
interest to preclude unprincipled land-related uses of public trust
resources. In addition, the language of the seminal U.S. Supreme
Court decision on the public trust doctrine, Illinois 'CentralRailroad v.
Illinois,354 suggests limits to what may be deemed a public interest. In
that case the Court held that a state can convey trust land only if it
"can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining."'5 5 The crucial language
here is "in the lands and waters remaining." That language modifies
and restricts the term "public interest." In other words, such lands
can be conveyed into private ownership only for purposes that are consistent with the public's interest in the public trust resources, not for
purposes that generally further the public interest.
E.

PrivateActions that Are Inconsistent with the Public Trust
Doctrine

Even where the state has conveyed tidelands and shorelands to private individuals, those lands generally continue to be burdened by the
public trust doctrine. 6 One way the Washington Supreme Court has
conceptualized this is by saying that the ownership of tidelands and
shorelands has two different aspects, the jus privatum, or proprietary
interest, that may be conveyed by the state, and thejus publicum, or
public authority interest, that may not be conveyed.35 7 Thus, when
the state conveys tidelands and shorelands to a private individual, it
conveys only the jus privatum, and retains thejus publicum for itself.
The court has also likened the trust to "'a covenant running with the
land (or lake or marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the
land's dependent wildlife.' ,,311 Private citizens or the Attorney General 359 may bring suits to enjoin private landowners from damaging
public trust interests.
Tidelands and shorelands in private hands are not, however, invariably burdened by the public trust. If land is no longer adaptable to
354. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
355. Id. at 453 (emphasis added). Washington adopted this apprcach in Caminiti v. Boyle,
107 Wash. 2d 662, 670, 732 P.2d 989, 994-95 (1987), cerL denied, 4:4 U.S. 1008 (1988).
356. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
357. Id. at 639, 747 P.2d at 1072.
358. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072-73 (quoting Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine:Is it
Amphibious?, I J. ENvTL. L. & LrriG. 107, 118 (1986)).
359. For a discussion of who can bring an action to enforce the pubic trust doctrine, see infra
part V.A.1.
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trust uses, it is no longer burdened by the trust." ° It should not
follow, however, that the public trust burden should be applied less
stringently to tidelands that are still usable for trust purposes but are
surrounded by built-up tidelands.36 1
Although the Washington Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to address the issue, it could find that prior appropriators, who
significantly reduce the flow of rivers or dry up waterbodies, are acting
in a manner inconsistent with the public trust.3 62 Although the court
has not had occasion to hold that appropriative rights are subject to
the public trust doctrine, it has held that appropriations of water that
lower lake levels can unreasonably interfere with riparian rights. In In
re Martha Lake Water Co., 63 the Washington Supreme Court held
that appropriators could not damage riparian rights by lowering the
level of the lake by twelve inches, thus exposing eight to fifty feet of
muddy lake bottom in front of the riparian lands. The court might
also limit appropriations which adversely affect public trust rights."'
The state's strong policy of preserving minimum instream flows further supports protecting public trust resources from damage by prior
appropriators. 65
IV.

A.

INTERFACE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
WITH THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE
WASHINGTON AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS
Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Avoid Takings
Claims

Even where the state has conveyed tidelands and shorelands to private individuals, those lands are still burdened by the public trust.
The trust resembles a "covenant running with the land" for the benefit
360. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 640 n.9, 747 P.2d at 1072 n.9 (citing Berkeley v. Superior Court,
606 P.2d 362 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980)).
361. In State Department of Ecology v. Ballard Elks Lodge No. 827, 84 Wash. 2d 551, 527
P.2d 1121 (1974), the court suggested that part of the reason the Elks Club could build its nonwater-dependent lodge over tidelands was because the site was located in a densely developed
portion of Shilshole Bay, where other non-water-dependent structures extended out over
tidelands. Now that the court has more firmly committed itself to the public trust doctrine, it
seems less likely that the court would allow a non-water-dependent use such as this, considering
the overall cumulative impact.
362. See Johnson, supra note 173, at 257-58; see also supra note 349 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Mono Lake case.
363. 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929).
364. See Johnson, supra note 173, at 244-45.
365. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.22, .54 (West Supp. 1991).
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not have the
of the public.3 66 As a result, private property owners do
3 67
t:rust.
public
the
with
inconsistent
anything
do
right to
Private landowners cannot claim a taking has occurred when regulations prevent them from doing things that would adversely affect
public trust interests. Whether or not the landowner had notice of the
burden the public trust doctrine imposed on the land is irrelevant; no
restrictions need be in the original conveyance.3 58 Instead, courts
impose the public trust doctrine as a matter of law.
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent opinion in PhillipsPetroleum Co.
v. Mississippi369 illustrates the fact that explicit notice about the public
trust to private landowners is unnecessary. In PhillipsPetroleum the
Court held that lands beneath non-navigable streams that were influenced by the ebb and flow of tides from the Gulf of Mexico were public trust lands and passed to Mississippi upon statehood under the
equal footing doctrine. The Court rejected the landowners' equitable
arguments that they were entitled to the land because they held the
lands under a pre-statehood grant and had paid taxes on the lands.
The Court insisted that earlier Mississippi cases had made the state's
claim to private tidelands clear.3 70 If the Court considers such notice
adequate to allow states to take possession of tidelands, afortiorisuch
notice should be adequate to apprise private landowners of the public
trust easement covering their property.
In Orion3 7 1 the Washington Supreme Court explored the relationship between takings claims and the public trust doctrine. Orion Corporation owned a large part of the tidelands in Padilla Bay, an
ecologically important estuary that is navigable at high tide. Orion
planned to dredge and fill the bay in order to create a residential,
Venetian-style community. In 1971 the Shoreline Management Act
identified the bay as a shoreline of statewide significance, and declared
that state policy required preservation and protection of the area. The
366. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
367. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
368. See, eg., id at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072 (noting that Orion purchased its land "subject to
the terms of the trust"). By contrast, Washington State requires all other encumbrances and
liens to be registered so as to protect purchasers. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.19.010 (West
1990). At least one commentator has suggested that areawide plans should be developed for
public access. James W. Scott, Washington State Department of Ecology, Shorelands Division,
An Evaluation of Access to Washington's Shorelines Since Passageof the Shoreline Management
Act of1971, 27 (Sept. 1983). In addition to enhancing public access, arzawide plans might be one
way of giving property owners (and potential buyers) notice of public rights.
369. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
370. Id. at 482. But cf Justice O'Connor's spirited dissent. Id. at 485.
371. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
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state later approved the Skagit County Shoreline Management Master
Program (SCSMMP), that designated Orion's lands as "aquatic," thus
prohibiting dredging and filling. These regulations combined to limit
commercially valuable uses to nonintensive recreation and aquaculture, the latter requiring a conditional use permit.372
In Orion the court decided that the tidelands of Padilla Bay were
burdened by the public trust doctrine. The court concluded that
"Orion never had the right to dredge and fill its tidelands, either for a
residential community or farmlands [s]ince a 'property right must
exist before it can be taken,' neither the SMA [Shoreline Act] nor the
SCSMMP effected a taking by prohibiting Orion's dredge and fill project."37' 3 Thus, the public trust doctrine can largely preclude a successful takings claim because private property owners have no right to
act in a manner inconsistent with public trust interests.
The court in Orion indicated that a takings issue might still exist if
the regulation of Orion's land unduly burdened uses that would be
consistent with the public trust doctrine. Under the SCSMMP, Orion
was strictly limited to using the bay for non-intensive aquaculture and
recreation. Orion claimed that its property might be usable for other
purposes that were consistent with the public trust. Because the trial
court record did not disclose whether Orion's property was adaptable
to any of these other uses, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings at the trial court level.3 7 4
Thus, the public trust doctrine does not bar all takings challenges.
If state and local regulation significantly burden uses that would be
consistent with the public trust, then private landowners may have a
takings action. The Washington Supreme Court has indicated that
although its analytical approach may differ from the federal test, the
breadth of constitutional protection against takings without compensation is virtually the same under both the state and federal
constitutions.3 75
B.

Takings Claims That May Be Raised by the Extension of the
Trust Doctrine

Although application of the public trust doctrine to lands traditionally within the trust will successfully prevent most takings challenges,
extension of the public trust doctrine to tributaries, uplands, and
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

626-29, 747 P.2d at 1065-67.
641-42, 747 P.2d at 1073 (citation omitted).
662, 747 P.2d at 1084.
657, 747 P.2d at 1082; see infra part IV.D.
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related lands may raise more serious takings issues. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Phillips Petroleum3 7 6 indicated that there are no constitutional limits preventing states from recognizing preexisting public
trust rights. Thus, public trust burdens on lands subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide and lands under navigable-for-title waterways are
likely immune from takings challenges. As indicated above, however,
some courts have expanded the geographical scope of the public trust
doctrine. As a result, states may regulate appropriLtions on non-navigable tributaries and related wetlands; guarantee public access to the
dry sand areas of beaches; and extend the public's right to use nonnavigable lakes and streams.3 77
Geographical extensions of the public trust doctrine could raise takings issues. One commentator has suggested that the Wisconsin
court's extension of the doctrine to wetlands may be constitutionally
suspect.378 Another commentator, Professor Lazarus, insists that if
the state tries to extend the doctrine beyond lands acquired at statehood, landowners have valid takings claims.379 Several courts, however, have examined the practical and environmental realities of
preserving public rights in extending the scope of the doctrine. For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the practical
problem that inadequate access poses to the full exercise of public
rights, and extended the doctrine to the privately owned dry sand area
of beaches. Other courts, such as the Wisconsin Supreme Court, have
recognized the interconnectedness of water resources and extended the
scope of the doctrine to prevent indiscriminate filling of wetlands. By
extending the doctrine to cover these areas, courts have preserved and
effectuated public rights rather than adhering to inflexible legal
doctrine.
C. Banishing the Specter of the Nollan Decision
Armed with the Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California
CoastalCommission, 350 many owners of land along beaches and shores
claim a taking has occurred whenever the state seeks to provide public
access to and along beaches. In Nollan, the California Coastal Com376. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
377. See supra part III.B.
378. Steven W. Turnbull, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: Accommodating the Public Need
Within ConstitutionalBounds. Orion Corp. v. State, 63 WASH. L. Rnv. 1087, 1106-07 (1988)
(discussing the Wisconsin court's opinion in Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1972)).
379. Lazarus, supra note 19, at 648-49.
380. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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mission tried to condition its grant of permission to rebuild a house on
the transfer of an easement across private beachfront property. The
easement would have secured lateral public passage across Nollan's
property along a strip of dry sand between the mean high tide line and
a seawall. The U.S. Supreme Court found that a taking had occurred
because there was no nexus between the governmental purpose of the
permit condition and the development ban.38 1
The Nollan decision, however, does not limit the application of the
public trust doctrine. First, the parties did not raise the public trust
doctrine as an issue. 312 If, as some courts have held, the public trust
doctrine covers the dry sand area,383 a state would not need to obtain
such an easement. Similarly, if the doctrine of custom provides the
public a right to the dry sand area of beaches, then public access does
not constitute a taking of private property. Second, even if a state
applies the Nollan reasoning, it may be able to meet the nexus requirement by adequately showing that a permit condition, such as a lateral
access easement, is related to legitimate state interests affected by the
development. If a state properly invoked the public trust doctrine and
the myriad public interests protected by it, courts may recognize that
beachfront and shorefront development affects substantial, legally recognized, public interests.
D. Takings and Public Trust Resources: Lucas v. South Carolina

Coastal Council
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council3 84 has set the stage for another case implicating public
trust resources and takings jurisprudence. Mr. Lucas owns a pair of
oceanfront lots in South Carolina. South Carolina, through its Beachfront Management Act,385 limited development on lots like Lucas'
that are located on the beach dune system. The Act prohibited,
through set-back lines, the construction of any permanent structures
on such property, except a small deck or walkway.3 8 6 The Act contained extensive findings and policy that suggested that these measures
381. Id. at 838-42.
382. In dissent, Justice Blackmun specifically stated that Nollan did not implicate in any way
the public trust doctrine. Id at 865.
383. See, eg., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 821 (1984).
384. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (Nov. 18, 1991, argued Mar. 2,
1992) (No. 91-453). Significantly, the court only addressed the takings issue. It declined to
consider other legal theories, such as the public trust doctrine. Id. at 896 n.1.
385. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
386. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 895-96.
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were necessary to prevent a serious public harm.38 7 In particular, the
legislative findings noted the delicate nature of the beach/dune system,
and stated that further development could cause significant erosion
Following Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De
problems.3 "
Benedictis,3 8 9 and Mugler v. Kansas,3 9° the South Carolina court in
Lucas held that no taking had occurred because the Act was an exercise of the police power that prevented a serious public harm. 39 1
Under Washington's current takings jurisprudence, the State of
Washington could potentially make a similar argument to defeat a regulatory takings claim in the coastal zone. Recently, the Washington
Supreme Court in Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cournty 392 attempted to
clarify the law of takings. The court created a threshold inquiry to
determine whether governmental action constitutes a taking. It will
only apply a takings analysis if the regulation provides a public benefit
(as opposed to a public harm) or it destroys one or more of the fundamental attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to exclude
others, and to dispose of the property.39 3 Therefore, an attempt to
regulate in the coastal zone could be immune from a takings claim if
its purpose was to prevent a public harm, and it did not destroy any
fundamental attributes of ownership.

387. Id at 896-98.
388. Id. at 897.
389. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
390. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
391. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899-902.
392. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
393. Id. at 329-30, 787 P.2d at 912. But note that this does not mean the state regulation is
necessarily valid. It may still violate due process. Id. at 330, 787 P.2d at 912-13. If the statute is
invalidated as violative of due process, however, it is much less likely that the state will face
liability for a temporary taking. Id. at 332 n.20, 787 P.2d at 913 n.20 (quoting Orion Corp. v.
State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 648-49, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1987), cer - denied, 486 U.S. 1022
(1988)). The court's mode of analysis in Presbytery has been questioned. See Jill M. Teutsch,
Comment, Taking Issue with Takings: Has the Washington Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, 66
WASH. L. REv. 545 (1991).
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V. FACTORS THAT IMPACT ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: JUDICIAL REMEDIES
AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A.

JudicialRemedies for Conduct Inconsistent with the Public
Trust Doctrine

1.

Enforcement by Private Citizens, Private Groups, and the
Attorney General

The issue of standing should not pose a serious obstacle to suits by
private citizens and private groups. In Caminiti,the plaintiffs were an
individual, Ms. Caminiti, and the members of the Committee for Public Shorelines Rights. 94 They challenged a state statute that allowed
private upland owners to build docks on public tidelands and shorelands without paying any rent to the state. The plaintiffs contended
that they had an interest in the amount of revenue collected by the
state, and they contended that the presence of private recreational
docks affected their access to and use of public lands.3 95 These uses
included, but were not limited to, their ability to fish, swim, navigate,
water-ski, beachcomb, procure shellfish, sunbathe, observe natural and
undisturbed wildlife, play on open beaches, and enjoy seclusion. 9 6
There appears to have been no serious issue over standing, because the
court in Caminiti never addressed the matter. Therefore, if private
citizens or citizens' groups allege that their interests in public trust
resources are affected by state or private action, and if they specifically
list their personal interests, then standing should not be a barrier to a
suit. In doctrinal terms, such a showing of interests would be adequate to establish that there was an injury in fact and that the plaintiffs
are among the injured parties. This liberal standing test is in accord
with the national trend toward loosening standing requirements in
397
environmental suits.

394. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988).
395. Id. at 665, 732 P.2d at 992.
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973); see also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 107-29 (2d ed. 1988). But cf Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (requiring a showing of specific injury before standing will be upheld so as
to withstand a summary judgment); Robin L. Juri & Katherine B. Steuer, Note, CourtAccessfor
Environmental Plaintiffs:Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REv. 187 (1991).
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The Attorney General has the power to protect state and public
interests by bringing suit to enforce the public trust doctrine. 398 The
Attorney General also has authority to enforce the Shoreline Management Act. 9 9
2. Other Ways for Public Trust Issues To Come Before the Court
Courts will also have to address public trust issues when a private
property owner claims that state regulation has caused the inverse
condemnation of his or her property. As was discussed in Part IV of
this Article, the public trust doctrine must be considered in determining whether a taking by excessive regulation has occurred.
B. Federal/StatePowers and the Public Trust Doctrine
1.

Limitations on State Power: Supremacy, Preemption, and Federal
Sovereign Immunity

State attempts to use the public trust doctrine may conflict with
federal power. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
the "Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, . . .shall be the
supreme law of the land."'
Accordingly, the courts have developed
the doctrine of federal preemption to determine when federal legislation prevents states from enacting laws. The U.S. Supreme Court has
succinctly described its preemption analysis:
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling
within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced
state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted
to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. 4° 1
Congress may preempt state law by expressly stating its intention to
do so in a federal statute. Generally, however, Congress does not
expressly address the preemption issue, so courts must look to legislative history to determine Congress' intent.
398.
399.
400.
401.
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WASH. R v. CODE ANN. § 43.10.030 (West 1983).
Id. § 90.58.210 (West Supp. 1991).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citations omitted).

Public Trust Doctrine
In general, state attempts to protect public trust resources are not
likely to encounter many preemption problems. 4 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court maintains a presumption against federal preemption when federal legislation enters an area of traditional state power.4 0 3 The public
trust doctrine, which protects local public interests and the environment, is a doctrine grounded in property law which is an area traditionally governed by the states.'
Furthermore, the federal
government's efforts to protect the environment have generally
stressed the importance of a collaborative effort between the states and
the federal government." 5 The U.S. Supreme Court has found that
some state laws, however, such as bans on supertankers over a certain
size, and standards for vessel design, construction, and navigational
equipment, were preempted by the federal Ports and Waterways
Safety Act.'
The Court found that the federal legislation demonstrated congressional intent that there be national uniformity in tanker
design standards." 7 Nevertheless, a more recent case involving the
issue of preemption of a state environmental law, California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,4 8 indicates the Court's continued
reluctance to find preemption of state laws that protect the
environment.
State public trust activities may also be precluded as an encroachment upon Congress' commerce power.4 Congress' power over navigation under the Commerce Clause extends primarily to waterbodies
that are navigable in fact. 410 Although Congress has paramount
402. For a discussion of federal preemption and state efforts to control oil pollution, see
Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 671 (1991).
403. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
404. See infra part III.A.
405. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (The Clean Water
Act) 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (West 1985); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U.S. 325 (1973).
406. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). But cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v.
Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1140 (1985) (holding that
Alaska's deballasting statute covering tankers was not preempted because it covered tanker
operations that could affect the environment, not design features).
407. Ray, 435 U.S. at 165-68.
408. 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (upholding California's right to review and require a permit for a
private mining project on United States Forest Service lands, despite federal legislation such as
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the National Forest Management Act, and the
Coastal Zone Management Act).
409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
410. Waterbodies are navigable in fact if "they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). Waterbodies need not be navigable in their original state, but only need
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power over state law in the area of interstate navigation, state regulation of navigation is given substantial leeway where there is no applicable congressional act, no need for national uniformity, and no
evidence that state action impedes interstate commerce.4 1 1
The federal government's sovereign immunity may also prohibit
states from enforcing the public trust doctrine against federal projects.
Federal projects "are subject to state regulation only when and to the
extent that congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous. 4 1 2
In practice, however, state regulation of federal projects has often been
allowed because of the policies Congress has set forth that suggest that
federal and state governments share responsibility in environmental
protection and natural resource management.4 13
In Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy,4 14. the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Navy's claim that, because of sovereign immunity, Washington, through the Shoreline Management Act, could not regulate the
Navy's project. In reaching its decision, the court first looked to the
federal Clean Water Act. 4 15 The Clean Water Act waives federal sovereign immunity with respect to state programs that either control the
discharge of dredged or fill material or operate to control and abate
water pollution.4 16 The court reasoned that Washington's Shoreline
Act was such a program, and therefore the Navy could not assert sovereign immunity to avoid the Shoreline Act's requirements.4 17 The
Friends of the Earth decision indicates that courts are likely to have
little tolerance for the antiquated doctrine of sovereign immunity in
light of states' legitimate interests in preserving their coastal
environments.
2. A Self-Imposed Limitation on FederalPower: The Consistency
Requirement of the Coastal Zone Management Act
Under their coastal zone management programs, states can limit,
modify, or prohibit activities of federal agencies and private actions
requiring federal permits under the consistency provisions of the fedto be made navigable by reasonable improvements in order to be navigable in fact. United States
v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
411. CONNORS & ARCHER, supra note 348, at 282-83.
412. Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976).
413. See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 4.80 U.S. 572, 580 (1987);
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976).
414. 841 F.2d 927, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1988).
415. Id. at 934.
416. Id. at 934-35.
417. Id.
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eral Coastal Zone Management Act.4" 8 By including public trust principles in their coastal zone management programs, states can
effectively influence federal activities and avoid federal preemption
questions.
Under the consistency requirement, federal agency activities
directly affecting the coastal zone must be consistent "to the maximum
extent practicable" with the enforceable policies of approved state
management programs.4 19 "Enforceable policies" include not only
state policies contained in constitutional provisions, laws, regulations,
land use plans, and ordinances, but also judicial or administrative
decisions.4 20 Therefore, federal agency activity must be consistent not
only with legislative and regulatory expressions of the public trust doctrine; federal agency activity must also be consistent with the public
trust doctrine as expressed by state courts. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's regulations have interpreted the phrase
"to the maximum extent practicable" to require "full consistency"
unless federal law prevents the federal agency from meeting this
requirement. 42 1
If private activity affects the land or water of the coastal zone, an
applicant for a federal permit must certify to the relevant federal
agency that the activity or project is consistent with the state's
enforceable policies.4 2 2 Once again, "enforceable policies" means not
only state laws and regulations, but also judicial opinions. Thus, decisions such as Orion423 and Caminiti4 24 that recognize the public trust
doctrine in Washington constitute enforceable policy. If the state
objects to the proposed project, the only way for the project to get
approved is for the Secretary of Commerce to override the state's
objection. The Secretary of Commerce, however, can only override a
state objection if the project is consistent with the national objectives
418. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
419. Id. § 1456(c)(1). The term "federal activity" means "any functions performed by or on
behalf of a Federal agency in the exercise of its statutory responsibilities." 15 C.F.R. § 930.31
(1992).
420. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(6a) (West Supp. 1992).
421. 15 C.F.1L § 930.32 (1992). Although the regulations provide for mediation of disputes
between the states and federal agencies, in practice the states have generally gone to federal court
to get injunctions against federal agencies. CoNORs & ARCHER, supra note 348, at 296.
422. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1456(c)(3)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1991).
423. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1022 (1988).
424. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988).
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of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act or the activity is necessary for national security.4 25
The State of Washington has clearly indicated in the Shoreline
Management Act that it will enforce the federal consistency requirement: "Where federal or interstate agency plans, activities or procedures conflict with state policies, all reasonable steps available shall be
taken by the state to preserve the integrity of its policies." 42 6 In addition to following the Shoreline Act, federal agencies and federal permittees must also follow several other state legislative programs.4 27
The Department of Ecology, which manages the state coastal management program, conducts the federal consistency reviews for the state
of Washington. The geographical scope of the coastal zone is very
large in Washington State, covering all fifteen Pacific Ocean and Puget
Sound coastal counties. The Department of Ecology also reviews federal activities outside of the coastal zone, but west of the crest of the
Cascade Range, to avert potential spillover effects that directly affect
the coastal zone. 42 8
Therefore, the consistency requirement of the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act provides an important mechanism for protecting
public trust resources from federal agency activity or federally permitted activity. Those activities must not only be consistent with state
laws, regulations, and plans that protect public trast resources; they
must also be consistent with judicial pronouncements of the doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The public trust doctrine is now firmly established in Washington
law. This Article has described the relation of the doctrine to the
state's police power, possible future development of the doctrine, and
related issues such as takings, standing, and preemption. In the future
the public trust doctrine will likely continue to be a powerful tool to
protect the public interest in tidelands and shorelands.
425. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1456(c)(3)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1991); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-.134
(1992).
426. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.260 (West Supp. 1991).
427. See Department of Ecology State of Washington Federal Consistency Procedures
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Washington Law Review). These legislative programs
include the State Environmental Policy Act, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C (west 1983 &
Supp. 1991); the Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE. AtN. § 90.48 (West 1962 &
Supp. 1991); the Clean Air Act, WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 70.94 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991),
and the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 80.50 (west 1991).
428. Department of Ecology State of Washington Federal Consistency Procedures, supra
note 427, at 7.

Public Trust Doctrine
This Article has discussed the difference between the property-based
public trust doctrine and regulatory statutes that are based on the
state's police powers. The public trust doctrine requires the judiciary
to review all governmental activity involving public trust resources
against substantive criteria. This is a unique feature of the doctrine.
Nonetheless, regulatory statutes and the doctrine have influenced
each other. They have an almost symbiotic relationship. Public trust
principles are often incorporated in statutes. The Washington
Supreme Court has also often looked to regulatory statutes, such as
the Shoreline Management Act, to define the parameters of the
doctrine.
The Article also discussed the current and potential scope of the
doctrine. In Orion, the Washington Supreme Court declined to decide
the entire scope of the doctrine.4 29 Thus, future development of the
doctrine seems likely. The decisions of other states may provide guidance for Washington's courts in developing the public trust doctrine.
Other courts have applied the doctrine to cover the dry sand area of
beaches, non-navigable-for-title tributaries, related wetlands, and the
surfaces of recreationally navigable waters. Other state courts have
also recognized new public trust values, such as aesthetic beauty and
the right of the public to walk over and harvest shellfish on privately
owned lands. State courts will likely continue to recognize new public
trust interests as public needs and priorities evolve.
Administrators and planners should also keep abreast of developments of the doctrine. They should consider the doctrine and its values when making decisions affecting public trust resources. Such
consideration would not be onerous because state and local officials
already consider similar issues under the Shoreline Management Act,
the Aquatic Lands Act and the State Environmental Policy Act.
The Article has also faced that veritable legal ogre, the takings issue,
and shown how application of the doctrine can avoid some claims of
unconstitutional taking. The public trust doctrine diminishes the
impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,43 0 that found that requiring an easement across
the dry sand area of a beach as a condition for a building permit constituted a taking without just compensation. Neither party raised the
public trust doctrine issue in that case. Had the Commission successfully argued that the doctrine be applied to the dry sand area rather
429. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
430. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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than merely seeking an easement from the owner, the outcome of the
case might very well have been different.
The public trust doctrine provides important protection for coastal
resources from harmful private development. In economic terms, it
requires owners of property affected by the trust to internalize the true
costs and benefits of development. Because society has historically
treated water resources as free and inexhaustible, the costs of this
resource's degradation have rarely been internalized in the cost of
development or production. This is "a classic case of market failure."4 3 1 The public trust doctrine helps to internalize such costs by
limiting development that damages resources in which we all have an
important interest.
Finally, this Article discussed two issues that may affect enforcement of the doctrine; standing and federal supremacy. At least from
the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in Caminiti,432 it appears
that private individuals and groups can easily meet the standing
requirement to bring a suit to protect public trust interests. Federal
supremacy also does not appear to thwart the doctrine. Congress has
passed no laws that limit the doctrine. In fact, through the consistency requirement of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, federal agency activity and permits are actually subject to the doctrine.
Well over thirteen hundred years ago, the compilers of Justinian's
Institutes articulated the core of what we know today as the public
trust doctrine: "[t]hings common to mankind by the law of nature, are
the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the
sea." 4 3 3 The vitality of the public trust doctrine today shows just how
important the public interest is in these resources. That vitality is not
surprising. The public access to and use of water resources fulfills very
real needs such as fishing, navigation, commerce, and recreation. But
there is also a human desire to be near water and use it that goes
beyond pragmatic concerns. As Herman Melville wrote in Moby
DickBut look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and
seemingly bound for a dive. Strange! Nothing will content them but the
extremist limit of the land; loitering under the shady lee of yonder warehouses will not suffice. No. They must get just as nigh the water as they
431. Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 409, 411 (1982).
432. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988).
433. J. INST. 2.1.1 in THOMAS COOPER, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 67 (New York,

Voorhies, 3d ed. 1852).
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possibly can without falling in. And there they stand-miles of themleagues. Inlanders all, they come from lanes and alleys, streets and avenues-north, east, south, and west. Yet here they all unite. Tell me,
does the magnetic virtue in the needles of the compasses of all these
ships attract them thither? 3 4

434. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DicK 94 (Penguin ed. 1986). The authors cannot claim
credit for finding this wonderful quote. See SLADE et al., supra note 40, at xxxv.
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